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The Uniform Arbitration Act [hereinafter UAA] was proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955.2 At
present, well over half of the states have enacted arbitration statutes based
upon the UAA.3 The purpose of this survey is to explain the principles
underlying recent court decisions interpreting the UAA, and provide a frame-
work for analyzing future cases.
4
I. VALnrrIY OF ARBiTRATION AGREEMENTS
The UAA provides that a written agreement to submit to arbitration "is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of a contract." 5 Recent cases interpreting the
UAA indicate that the determination of the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment will be affected by the court's desire to avoid piecemeal resolution of
conflicts and the application of contract principles to the agreement.
2. Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 1 - 25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as UAA].
3. Jurisdictions which have enacted arbitration statutes based upon the UAA
are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming.
4. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J.
Dsp. REs. 169 [hereinafter Recent Developments 1986]; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. DsP. Rm. 173 [hereinafter Recent Develop-
ments 19851; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. Dsp.
RES. 207 [hereinafter Recent Developments 19841; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1983) [hereinafter Recent Developments 1983].
The 1986 survey collected cases interpreting and applying the UAA decided between
September, 1984 and September, 1985. The 1985 survey collected cases decided be-
tween September, 1983 and September, 1984. The 1984 survey collected cases decided
between September, 1982 and September, 1983. The 1983 survey collected cases de-
cided before September, 1982. This article surveys cases decided between September,
1985 and September, 1986.
5. UAA § 1.
2




Although courts generally favor the resolution of disputes through ar-
bitration, some courts have tempered their enthusiasm with an expressed
concern for avoiding piecemeal resolution of conflicts. Judicial economy may
require prohibiting arbitration of claims when some of the claims are non-
arbitrable and arbitration of the remainder would result in duplication of
presentations and evidence before the arbitration panel and the circuit court.6
In Joba Construction v. Monroe County Drain Commission 7 Joba had a
contract with Monroe County to construct a water pollution control facility.
The contract contained an arbitration agreement. When the Monroe County
Drain Commission became dissatisfied with Joba's work, it issued a stop
order. Joba filed for arbitration pursuant to the contract, and, in addition,
sued the commissioner in circuit court requesting the same relief as requested
in the arbitration claim. The commissioner and the county filed a counter-
claim against Joba, alleging abuse of process. The county also sued the surety
on a performance bond, and the surety filed a third party complaint against
Joba seeking indemnification. The action on the performance bond was con-
solidated with Joba's suit and Monroe County was added as a defendant in
Joba's action. The court stated that the abuse of process claim and the action
on the performance bond were not subject to arbitration.8 The court reasoned
that the repetition of evidence and presentations to the arbitrator and in the
court would be inconsistent with the arbitration objective of providing an
inexpensive and expeditious disposition of disputes. 9 Therefore, the court
held that the principle of judicial economy prohibited arbitration. 0
In contrast, the court in Steinberg v. Prudential-Bache Securities," held that
a dispute was arbitrable despite the fact that arbitration may be detrimental
to a class action proceeding. 2 In Steinberg, a client initiated a class action
suit against Prudential-Bache for improper use of customers' funds. The
defendant moved to compel arbitration in accordance with the client's agree-
ment. The court compelled arbitration, holding that strong policy consid-
erations required an arbitration agreement to be upheld despite probable
detriment to class action proceedings. 3 Employing a balancing test, the court
concluded that the policies favoring arbitration outweighed those underlying
the maintenance of a class action.
4
6. Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Commissioner, 150 Mich.
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B. Application of Contract Principles
The UAA provides that an arbitration agreement is valid unless grounds
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract." As a result, courts
apply contract principles to determine the validity of an arbitration agree-
ment.
1. The Writing Requirement
The UAA requires that an arbitration agreement be in writing.' 6 The
arbitration agreement may be either a clause within a written contract, or a
separate written agreement. Rules of a commodity exchange which contain
an arbitration provision may constitute a sufficient writing under the UAA. 7
In Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,'8 plaintiff signed a contract with
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) saying that plaintiff, as a member of
CME, agreed to abide by its rules, orders, and bylaws. The rules included
an arbitration clause which stated that litigation between disputing members
was against CME policy. The court viewed the rules as analogous to corporate
bylaws and stated that bylaws may constitute a sufficient writing to satisfy
the Illinois Arbitration Act. 9 The court, however, interpreted the arbitration
clause in the rules to be non-compulsory, 20 as the rules simply stated a policy.
Therefore, plaintiff was not compelled to submit disputes to arbitration. 2'
The court's conclusion was reinforced by an additional clause in the rules
which required opposing parties to sign an arbitration agreement before any
arbitration proceeding commenced. The court reasoned that if arbitration
were compulsory by virtue of the arbitration clause, the execution of an
arbitration agreement would be superfluous.?
Although courts almost always require that an arbitration agreement be
in writing, at least one court has found an enforceable arbitration agreement
without the existence of a writing. 23 In Hot Springs County School District
v. Strube Construction Co., u the School District argued that because there
was no arbitration agreement in its contract with a construction company,
15. UAA § 1.
16. Id.
17. Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 141 Ill. App. 3d 129, 490 N.E.2d
39 (1986).
18. Id.
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the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by proceeding with the arbitration.
In rejecting this contention, the court stated, "an agreement to arbitrate need
not be written and can arise as the result of the conduct of the parties to an
existing dispute regardless of whether or not they have previously contracted
for arbitration. '"21 The court held that by participating in the arbitration, the
School District waived its right to raise the issue of whether or not the dispute
was subject to arbitration. 6
2. Fraudulent Inducement
Fraudulent inducement is a ground for revocation of an arbitration
agreement. 27 In Grane v. Grane,2 a dispute arose over the division of a
family-owned business. Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory relief despite
the existence of an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff alleged that the agree-
ment's designated arbitrator had fraudulently induced him into signing the
agreement. The trial court, however, dismissed the arbitrator from plaintiff's
law suit on the grounds that the arbitrator was immune from liability.2 The
appellate court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to a hearing to determine
whether the arbitration agreement had been the result of fraudulent induce-
ment, and therefore, could be voided.30 The court held that in the absence
of a valid arbitration agreement, the arbitrator is not shielded by immunity. 3'
3. Repudiation
A party's repudiation of a contract containing an arbitration agreement
does not constitute a waiver of that party's right to compel arbitration under
the contract, absent a specific repudiation of the arbitration agreement.32 In
U.S. Insulation Inc. v. Hilro Construction,3 Hilro, a general contractor,
repudiated its contract with U.S. Insulation (USI), a subcontractor, because
USI had failed to include certain materials in its bid price. Although the
contract contained an arbitration clause, USI filed suit for damages. Hilro
then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that by repudiating the
25. Id. at 545 (citing 5 Am. Juz. 2D, Arbitration and Award § 12, (1962);
and 6 C.J.S., Arbitration § 8, 17 (1975)).
26. Hot Springs, 715 P.2d at 546.
27. Grane v. Grane, 143 I11. App. 3d 979, 493 N.E.2d 1112 (1986).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 981, 493 N.E.2d at 1114 (quoting Tameri v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778,
780 (7th Cir. 1977) "an arbitrator is immune from suit for all acts which he performs
in his capacity as an arbitrator").
30. Id. at 983, 493 N.E.2d at 1116.
31. Id.
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contract, Hilro had not waived its right to compel arbitration. s4 The court
reasoned that the concept of separability was embodied in the law of arbi-
tration." Therefore, the arbitration clause was "an agreement separate from
the principal contract, ' 36 and was enforceable absent evidence that the ar-
bitration clause itself had been repudiated.3
7
II. WAIVER
Arbitration is a contract right which may waived.3 8 The issue of waiver
must be determined as a preliminary matter as a finding of waiver will
substantially alter what otherwise would have been a party's right to arbi-
tration. A waiver of the right to arbitrate will prevent a party from compelling
arbitration under the contract.3 9 Similarly, a party may become bound by an
adverse arbitration award by waiver of the right to raise an objection, claim,
or defenseA °
A. Right to Compel Arbitration
Courts will find a waiver of the right to compel arbitration when a party
engages in conduct deemed to be inconsistent with a right to arbitrate. 4' Such
conduct may include repudiation of the arbitration agreement,42 submission
of arbitrable issues to litigation, 43 and failure to make a timely assertion of
rights." A number of courts require that conduct inconsistent with a right
to arbitrate prejudice the adverse party before it can constitute a waiver.4
1. Repudiation of the Arbitration Agreement
A party that repudiates an arbitration agreement waives the right to later
compel arbitration." The right is not waived, however, by a party that re-
34. Id.
35. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 493.
36. Id. (citing M. Domx , LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1968)).
37. U. S. Insulation, 146 Ariz. at - , 705 P.2d at 493.
38. Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., 342 S.E.2d 853 (N.C.
1986).
39. See infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
41. Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No.1, 142 Il. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d
1322 (1986).
42. U.S. Insulation v. Hilro Construction, 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (1985).
43. Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Comm'r, 150 Mich. App.
173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
44. Moorcroft v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 720 P.2d 178 (Hawaii 1986).
45. Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., 342 S.E.2d 853, 854 (N.C.
1986).
46. U.S. Insulation, 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490.
6
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pudiates other obligations under the contract. 47 In U.S. Insulation Inc. v.
Hilro Construction Co.,41 USI and Hilro entered into a contract which con-
tained an arbitration clause. In response to alleged breaches of the contract
by USI, Hilro gave written notice that it was considering the contract to be
"no longer in effect. ' 49 USI filed a damage suit and Hilro moved to stay
proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to the contract. USI objected
on the ground that Hilro had waived the right to compel arbitration when
it repudiated the contract. The court held that while a repudiation of the
arbitration clause itself, or a claim that the contract was void ab initio, would
waive the right to arbitrate, repudiation of any other obligation under the
contract would not. 5° Therefore, Hilro's repudiation did not constitute a
waiver of the right to compel arbitration.
5
1
2. Participation in Litigation
Waiver may be implied when a party actively participates in litigation. 52
In Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Commissioner,3 Joba
filed a demand for arbitration after the County Drain Commission issued a
stop work order on construction of water pollution control facilities. After
requesting arbitration, Joba then filed a complaint in the Monroe County
circuit court asking for relief similar to that sought in arbitration. When the
County and the drain commissioner counterclaimed, Joba denied the coun-
terclaim, but failed to raise arbitration as a defense. Joba engaged in dis-
covery by both answering interrogatories and submitting interrogatories of
its own. The court found that Joba evinced considerable behavior inconsistent
with the right to arbitrate, and had therefore waived the right.5 4 Waiver was
founded in Joba's submission of arbitrable issues to litigation, failure to raise
arbitration as a defense in replying to the counterclaim, and participation in
discovery.I
In contrast, the court in Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1, 1 refused
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at , 705 P.2d at 498.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Comm'r, 150 Mich. App.
173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 179-80, 388 N.W.2d at 254.
55. The Joba decision was also based in part upon judicial economy. Since
some of the claims between the parties were not arbitrable, and those claims required
presentation of the same evidence, the court felt that economy would be better served
by settling the claims all in one judicial proceeding rather that bifurcating them into
judicial and arbitration proceedings.
56. 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
1987]
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to find a waiver when a defendant engaged in various procedural motions and
participated in discovery before finally seeking to compel arbitration. In
Kostakos, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to dissolve a joint venture created
by a contract which contained an arbitration clause. During the following
months, defendant participated in plaintiff's depositions and filed a number
of motions with the court. Ultimately, defendant filed an answer invoking the
arbitration clause in the joint venture contract as an affirmative defense. After
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendant filed a motion to compel
arbitration. The court held that defendant had not waived its right to arbitrate
by participating in the litigation, as waiver is to be determined by the types
of issues submitted, not the number of papers filed with the court.5" Defen-
dant had not submitted substantive issues to the court for determination,
asserted counterclaims, filed interrogatories or taken dispositions. Under these
facts, the court held that defendant's participation in the litigation had not
constituted waiver of its right to seek arbitration."
The court in Servomation v. Hickory Construction59 held that the mere
filing of a complaint does not result in a waiver, absent evidence showing
prejudice to the adverse party. In Servomation, plaintiff filed suit seeking
recovery for the negligent construction of a roof. Defendant asserted as a
defense the plaintiff's failure to submit the dispute to arbitration as required
by their contract. Defendant also filed a third-party complaint and served
interrogatories on plaintiff. The court held that the third-party complaint
and the interrogatories would not constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate
without some evidence that plaintiff had been prejudiced by those actions. 6w
Evidence of prejudice could include being forced to bear the expense of a
long trial, losing helpful evidence, taking steps in litigation to plaintiff's
detriment, expending significant amounts of money on the litigation, or mak-
ing available to the opponent the use of judicial discovery procedures not
available in arbitration. 61 The court, however, specifically rejected the con-
tention that the expense of answering interrogatories would be sufficient to
show prejudice. 2
Similarly, in Sentry Engineering and Construction Inc. v. Mariner's Cay
Development Corp. ,63 the court held that a showing of prejudice is required
when waiver through participation in litigation is asserted. Sentry involved
a contract for the construction of condominiums. As the project neared
completion, Sentry filed a mechanics lien and an arbitration claim. Sentry
then petitioned the circuit court for an injunction permitting access to the
57. Id. at - , 491 N.E.2d at 1325.
58. Id.
59. 342 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. 1986).
60. Id. at 854.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 855.
63. 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
8
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site so as to correct deficiencies in the roof. On appeal, Mariner's Cay
Development argued that seeking the injunction in the circuit court was
inconsistent with Sentry's right to arbitrate and was, therefore, a waiver of
that right. Sentry answered that seeking the injunction was not inconsistent
with arbitration, as Sentry did not seek to litigate any arbitrable issues.
Holding that prejudice rather than inconsistency is determinative, the court
refused to find waiver when Mariner's Cay had made no showing that it had
been prejudiced by having to litigate the injunction."
3. Failure to Make a Timely Assertion
In U.S. Insulation v. Hilro Construction Co.,61 the court held that a
party that had no obligation to seek arbitration could not be held to have
waived the right to compel arbitration through delay. In U.S. Insulation,
USI argued that Hilro had waived its right to compel arbitration through
delay. The argument was rejected by the court because the particular agree-
ment between the parties placed the obligation to seek arbitration on USI.6
Hilro's delay could not operate as a waiver when Hilro was under no obli-
gation to seek arbitration.
67
The court in Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1 held that when
both plaintiff and defendant had been dilatory, defendant's delay did not
constitute a waiver of the right to compel arbitration. Fifteen months after
plaintiff initiated its lawsuit, defendant filed an answer raising the arbitration
agreement as a defense. An additional eight months passed before defendant
filed a motion to compel arbitration. The court refused to hold that defend-
ant's delay prejudiced plaintiff and resulted in waiver of defendant's right
to compel arbitration as plaintiff had also been guilty of procrastination in
the pursuit of his lawsuit.6
9
An insurance company may waive its right to compel arbitration by
allowing its insured driver to proceed with a lawsuit against the other driver. 0
Moorcroft v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii,7 1 involved a dispute between
an insured and her insurance company after the company neither accepted
64. Id. at __, 338 S.E.2d at 634.
65. 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (1985).
66. The arbitration clause provided that when controversies arose, USI would
be deemed to agree with Hilro's decision unless USI sought arbitration within 30
days. Id. at 258, 705 P.2d at 498.
67. Id.
68. 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
69. Id. at 536, 491 N.E.2d at 1325.
70. Moorcroft v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 720 P.2d 178 (Hawaii 1986).
71. Id. Hawaii had not adopted the UAA, but the court relied on precedent
from UAA jurisdictions in reaching its decision.
1987]
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nor denied the insured's claim for uninsured motorist benefits. Keeping the
insurance company apprised of the proceedings, the insured sued the unin-
sured driver and obtained a judgment. When she requested that the insurance
company pay her the full amount of the judgment, the company demanded
arbitration. The court held that by allowing her to proceed with her lawsuit,
the insurance company had waived its right to submit the issues of liability
and damages to arbitration. 72
B. Right to Raise Claims
Claims may be deemed to be waived when a party fails to properly assert
them .7 In Hedlund v. Citizen's Security Mutual Insurance Company of Red
Wing,74 a widower sought costs and prejudgment interest when he applied
for confirmation of an arbitration award. The court held that the costs and
prejudgment interest could not be awarded by the court because they had
not been awarded by the arbitrators and were requested only upon application
for confirmation of the award. 7" Failure to move for modification or cor-
rection of the award resulted in waiver of the claim for costs and prejudgment
interest.76
Similarly, in Wanschura v. Western National Mutual Insurance Com-
pany," the court denied prejudgment interest to a plaintiff who failed to ask
that it be included in the arbitration award. The father of a child killed in
an automobile accident received an award from an arbitration panel and
upon motion to confirm the award, asked for prejudgment interest. The
court ruled that he had waived his claim for the interest by failing to ask
that it be included in the arbitration award. 78 Therefore, it could not be
awarded by the court upon a motion to confirm. 79
C. Right to Object to Arbitrability
In Hot Springs County School District v. Strube Construction Co.,90 the
court found that participation in arbitration proceedings without a proper
objection to arbitrability constitutes a waiver of any rights to later object.
72. Id. at 180.
73. Hedlund v. Citizen's Security Mutual Ins. Co. of Red Wing, 377 N.W.2d
460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 464.
76. Id.
77. 389 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
78. Id. at. 928.
79. Id.
80. 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986).
10
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Strube was involved in construction of a football field for the School District
when a dispute over the project arose. The contract between the parties did
not contain an arbitration clause, but Strube requested arbitration. In its
answer to the arbitration request, the School District claimed that the Wy-
oming Public Works Standards and Specifications were incorporated into
the contract, and that since those specifications required that any request for
arbitration be made within thirty days of the occurrence of the dispute,
Strube's request for arbitration was untimely. At the outset of the arbitration
hearing, the School District moved to dismiss on the same grounds. The
motion was denied by the arbitration panel and the arbitration proceeded.
The arbitrators found in favor of Strube. The award was confirmed and the
School District appealed.8 The appellate court first found that the Wyoming
Public Works Standards and Specifications were not a part of the contract,
and therefore, the School District's objection to timeliness failed. 2 Despite
the dissent's opinion that the objection to timeliness evinced an intent to
oppose arbitration of the dispute and should have been enough to preserve
the school district's right to object to arbitrability,83 the majority held that
by participating in the arbitration proceeding without objecting to arbitra-
bility, the School District waived its right to oppose arbitration.'
D. Right to Assert Grounds for Vacation
A party that fails to comply with the time requirements of the arbitration
statute will be deemed to have waived the right to assert grounds for vacation
of an arbitration award.85 In Walter A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan,8 6 an apart-
ment owner received an arbitration award against the managing agent of one
of her apartments and filed for confirmation of the award. The agent's
answer raised a number of defenses and sought vacation of the award. The
answer, however, was filed 107 days after the delivery of the award instead
of within the maximum 90 days. 7 The court held that by failing to assert
his defenses within the 90 day limit, the agent was deemed to have waived
them. 88
Similarly, the plaintiff in Littlejohn v. Keystone Insurance Co.89 became
involved in a dispute with her insurance company over her uninsured motorist
81. Id. at 541.
82. Id. at 545.
83. Id. at 551.
84. Id. at 546.
85. Walter A.Brown, Inc. v. Moylan, 509 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1986).
86. Id.
87. D.C. CODE ANi. §§ 16-4310, 16-4311(b) require that reasons to vacate
be presented within 90 days of delivery of the award.
88. Brown, 509 A.2d at 100.
89. 353 Pa. Super. 63, 509 A.2d 334 (1986).
19871
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benefits, and the matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrators found
for the insurance company and Littlejohn's motion to vacate was denied.
On appeal, she asserted a new ground for vacation. The court dismissed the
new objection as waived by the failure to raise it in the lower court. 0
III. A BITRABIITY
Parties are essentially free to define in their written arbitration agree-
ments what issues will be subject to arbitration.9 If parties later disagree on
whether a specific dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement, a court
must determine the arbitrability of the dispute. 2 In determining arbitrability,
courts will examine the existence and scope of the arbitration agreement. 93
A. Existence of Agreement
In Elbadramany v. Stanley," the court held that a provision in the bylaws
of a voluntary association which required that disputes between members be
submitted to arbitration constituted a binding agreement between the mem-
bers." In Elbadramany, the plaintiff and defendant were real estate brokers
and members of the Board of Realtors (Board). The Board membership
application included a provision mandating compliance with all Board by-
laws, rules, and regulations. One bylaw required settlement of all disputes
between members through an arbitration process.96 When a disagreement
arose over a commission, the parties arbitrated the issue. Plaintiff, however,
objected to the proceedings, asserting that no agreement existed between him
and defendant which required them to arbitrate their dispute.9 The appellate
court held that the association bylaws constituted a valid arbitration agree-
ment between members and, therefore, plaintiff and defendant were required
to arbitrate their dispute. 9
90. Id. at -, 509 A.2d at 336.
91. Fort Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, 490 N.E.2d
337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
92. The UAA restricts when arbitrability may be addressed by the courts.
Courts may decide the issue of arbitrability when a party moves to compel or stay
arbitration. UAA § 2. Further, courts may rule on arbitrability when a motion to
vacate an award is made on the grounds that a valid arbitration agreement does not
exist. UAA § 12(a)(5).
93. See e.g., Fryer v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 249, 253
(Minn. 1985).
94. 490 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
95. Id. at 966.
96. Id. at 964-65.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 966.
12
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In Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,"' the court held that a com-
modity exchange rule which stated that litigation was contrary to exchange
policy and provided for arbitration of disputes did not constitute a compulsory
arbitration agreement.'0  A member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
filed an arbitration claim against the plaintiff, who refused to submit to the
jurisdiction of the arbitration panel and filed suit to vacate the arbitration
award against him. The lower court confirmed the award.' 0 ' In reversing, the
appellate court reasoned that CME rules did not constitute a compulsory agree-
ment between members to arbitrate. The rules did not expressly prohibit litiga-
tion between members but instead stated that it was contrary to CME policy.0
Since the language of the agreement was noncompulsory, the plaintiff could
not be compelled to submit to arbitration.0 3
Where two contracts are treated as integrated, an arbitration clause in
one contract may be held to apply to disputes arising under either contract.104
In Sentry Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Development
Corporation ,Io owner and contractor concurrently executed documents cov-
ering construction costs (cost document) and profits and costs over construc-
tion costs (profit document). The cost document contained an arbitration
provision and incorporated the profit document through an agreement mod-
ification provision.10 The profit document incorporated the cost document
by reference. 1' The court found the two documents had been executed for
the single purpose of providing compensation for construction and, therefore,
comprised a single contract.'08 The court then applied the contract principle
which provides that in the absence of a contrary intention, where multiple
instruments are concurrently executed by the same parties, for the same
purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, the instruments will be
treated as a single contract.109 The court held that the arbitration provision
in the cost document applied to the contract as a whole and not merely to
the portion of the contract evidenced by the cost document."
Similarly, in Evansville- Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Evansville Teachers
Association,"' a teacher contended that an arbitration clause contained in a
collective bargaining agreement should be applied to disputes arising under
99. 141 IH. App. 3d 129, 490 N.E.2d 39 (1986).




104. Sentry Engineering & Construction Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Dev. Corp., 287
S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
105. Id.
106. Id. at -, 338 S.E.2d at 632-33.
107. Id. at -- 338 N.E.2d at 633.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at -, 338 S.E.2d at 633-34.
111. - Ind. App. - , 494 N.E.2d 321 (1986).
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a supplemental Side Letter Agreement. The school district argued that only
disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement should be subject
to arbitration."2 The language in the Side Letter Agreement, however, clearly
stated that it was a supplement to the collective bargaining agreement.'I As
a result, the court found that grievances arising under the Side Letter Agree-
ment were subject to arbitration."'
In contrast, the court in Board of Education of Indian Prairie Com-
munity School District No. 204, Dupage and Will Counties v. Indian Prairie
Education Ass'n, lEA/NEA,115 held that a memorandum attached to a col-
lective bargaining agreement was not part of the agreement.1 6 The memo-
randum was contained in the same pamphlet as the collective bargaining
agreement, but was separated by a divider page which stated, "these Memos
are not part of the negotiated Agreement."" 7 The Association filed a griev-
ance on behalf of a teacher who claimed he was wrongly assigned to a
supervision period in contravention of the terms of the memorandum. The
Board contended that the memorandum was not to take effect until the
following semester. The Association then filed a demand for arbitration
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Acknowledging that the
dispute would be arbitrable were the memorandum part of the collective
bargaining agreement, the appellate court invoked the principle that a party
can be compelled to submit to arbitration only if he has contracted to do
so." Since the memorandum was not part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and the parties contracted to submit to arbitration disputes arising
under the collective bargaining agreement only, the dispute involving the
contents of the memorandum was not arbitrable. 119
In Kelsey & Son, Inc. v. Architectural Openings, Inc. '2 the court refused
to extend an arbitration clause in a written contract to disputes arising under
a subsequent oral contract. In Kelsey, a general contractor and a subcon-
tractor entered into a written contract for the construction and installation
of dormitory closet doors. The written contract contained an arbitration
clause. Subsequently, the parties entered into an oral agreement for the pro-
duction of metal wardrobes. Payment disputes arose regarding both projects
and the subcontractor filed a motion to compel arbitration.'' The court held
disputes arising under the oral agreement were not subject to arbitration.1' "
112. Id. at -, 494 N.E.2d at 325.
113. Id. at , 494 N.E.2d at 325-26.
114. Id. at -, 494 N.E.2d at 326.
115. 139 Il. App. 3d 1040, 487 N.E.2d 1149 (1985).
116. Id. at 1045, 487 N.E.2d at 1153.
117. Id. at 1042, 487 N.E.2d at 1151.
118. Id. at 1044, 487 N.E.2d at 1152.
119. Id. at 1045, 407 N.E.2d at 1153.
120. 484 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
121. Id. at 611.
122. Id.
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The court refused to extend the arbitration clause of the written agreement
to the oral contract in the absence of an express agreement to do so.' 23
A claim for relief based on an implied contract theory is not subject to
arbitration under the UAA, as there is no express arbitration agreement.' 2 '
In Shaffer v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,'25 an employee filed a peti-
tion with the Board of Claims, seeking reimbursement for travel expenses.
The employee based his claim on a theory of implied contract. 6 This dispute
was not arbitrable because no express agreement to arbitrate can exist under
an implied contract theory."'
Similarly, in Johnson v. Travelers,1's the court refused to compel arbi-
tration where plaintiff sought relief under an implied contract theory.
29
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by an uninsured vehicle. Although
plaintiff did not have uninsured motorist coverage, Pennsylvania law required
insurers to provide uninsured motorist benefits to their insureds just as if
their policies included such coverage.130 Plaintiff used an implied contract
theory to argue that because all Pennsylvania insurance contracts must pro-
vide for binding arbitration to resolve disputes regarding uninsured motorist
benefits, plaintiff was entitled to arbitration despite the fact that there was
no express arbitration agreement.' 3' The court refused to order arbitration
in the absence of an express agreement between the parties.'3
B. Scope of Agreement
In Fort Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Education Associ-
ation, Inc.,"' the court declared that "[s]ince arbitration arises through con-
tract, the parties are essentially free to define for themselves what questions
may be arbitrated. . . ."13 In Fort Wayne, the School District and the
Association took part in an arbitration process required by their collective
bargaining agreement. The arbitration was the result of a dispute which arose
over the adjustment of class size in the School District. 35 After an arbitration
123. Id.
124. Shaffer v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 92 Pa. Commw. 374, 500
A.2d 917 (1985). See also UAA § 1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at -, 500 A.2d at 919.
127. Id. at -, 500 A.2d at 921.
128. 348 Pa. Super. 278, 502 A.2d 206 (1985).
129. Id. at - , 502 A.2d at 209.
130. 31 PA. ADmw. CODE § 63.2 (Shephards ).
131. Johnson, 348 Pa. Super. at - , 502 A.2d at 208.
132. Id. at - , 502 A.2d at 209.
133. 490 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
134. Id. at 341.
135. Id. at 338.
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award in favor of the Association, the School District appealed.'3 6 The School
District claimed that the arbitrator's award should be modified or vacated
because the arbitrator did not specify which collective bargaining provision
had been violated. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the School Dis-
trict's argument. The arbitrator's decision, said the court, clearly stated the
specific provision applicable to the dispute.'37 The court went on to note that
the parties were essentially free to define for themselves what questions could
be arbitrated.13 8 The dispute in question was, therefore, subject to arbitra-
tion.' 39
In U.S. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro Construction Co.,'4 the court held that
arbitration clauses should be construed liberally, and any doubts concerning
the arbitrability of a dispute should be resolved in favor of arbitration.''
When Hilro declared its contract with USI to be "null and void, '' 42 USI
brought an action for damages caused by Hilro's alleged repudiation of the
contract. Hilro, in turn, moved to compel arbitration and stay court pro-
ceedings. USI argued that the arbitration provision applied only to disputes
arising during the course of performance and not to controversies arising
prior to the commencement of performance, as the arbitration clause covered
"work done" and "material or services furnished."" 3 Because the contract
had been declared "null and void," USI claimed that no performance had
occurred and thus, there was no duty to arbitrate. The court initially noted
that parties are bound to arbitrate only the issues which by clear language
of the provision are subject to arbitration, and that agreements to arbitrate
will not be extended by construction or implication.'" The court determined,
however, that prior case law mandated a liberal construction of arbitration
clauses so that any doubts concerning the arbitrability of a dispute should
be resolved in favor of arbitration."3 The court held, therefore, that in the
absence of language expressly restricting the provision to disputes arising
during performance, no such restriction should be found.' 6
In Beemik Builders & Constructors, Inc. v. Huber Plumbing, Inc.,'4 the
parties' subcontract for plumbing work contained an arbitration clause which
provided for arbitration of claims, disputes, or other questions arising out
136. Id. at 339.
137. Id. at 341.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (1985).
141. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 498.
142. Id. at -, 705 P.2d 492.
143. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 498.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at -, 705 P.2d at 499.
147. 476 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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of or relating to the subcontract. A dispute arose over services performed
by the subcontractor beyond those originally covered in the subcontract. The
court held that the dispute was within the language of the arbitration clause. 48
In Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No.1, 149 the court held that the broad
language of the arbitration agreement contained in a joint venture contract
extended to disputes that did not directly arise out of the joint venture.5 0
The joint venture owned Point West Condominiums and was a limited part-
ner in a limited partnership which was to develop the condominiums. The
arbitration agreement in the joint venture contract encompassed all disputes
"arising out of or regarding this Agreement or the Property."'' Subse-
quently, disputes arose regarding the joint venture and the limited partner-
ship. The plaintiff contended that only those claims arising out of the joint
venture agreement were arbitrable as only the joint venture contract contained
an arbitration clause. 5 2 The court, however, reasoned that whether the prop-
erty referred to in the arbitration clause was defined as the limited partnership
share owned by the joint venture, or the actual real estate owned by the joint
venture,' the claims all ultimately involved the joint venture by virtue of
its ownership of the limited partnership share. 5 4 Therefore, the court held
that all the claims were sufficiently related to the joint venture agreement to
come within the joint venture arbitration clause.'
In Wessell Brothers Foundation Drilling Co. v. Crossett Public School
District,5 6 the court held that an arbitration agreement should be interpreted
to include not only disputes which fall within the strict language of the
agreement, but also those which fall within its spirit.'1 7 In Wessell, the School
District entered into a contract with an architectural firm and a general
contractor for the construction of a school building. When the building began
showing serious structural defects, the School District sued the architectural
firm and the general contractor. The general contractor filed a third party
complaint against its subcontractor, Wessell. All parties subsequently entered
into an agreement to arbitrate covering controversies "more specifically de-
scribed" in the pleadings.' 58 The arbitrator issued an award holding Wessell
liable to the School District.'9 Based upon the arbitration provision, however,
148. Id. at 781.
149. 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).





155. Id. at 539, 491 N.E.2d at 1327.
156. 287 Ark. 415, 701 S.W.2d 99 (1985).
157. Id. at 418, 701 S.W.2d at 101.
158. Id. at 417-18, 701 S.W.2d at 100-01.
159. Id. at 418, 701 S.W.2d at 101.
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Wessell argued that since the School District never filed a complaint against
Wessell directly, Wessell could not be bound by the arbitration award. The
court held that Wessell's contention did not withstand careful scrutiny, for
the provision did not say the arbitration was to be strictly controlled by the
pleadings.' 60 Rather, the pleadings were to further explain the disputed is-
sues.' 61 The court, in noting that the rules of contract construction and
interpretation apply to arbitration agreements, sought to give effect to the
intent of the parties.'16 The court stated that "arbitration agreements will
not be construed within the strict letter of the agreement but will include
subjects within the spirit of the agreement. Doubts and ambiguities of cov-
erage should [therefore] be resolved in favor of arbitration."'' 63
Despite the policy of broad interpretation of arbitration clauses, courts
refuse to hold that an issue is arbitrable where the language of an agreement
reflects the parties' intent not to subject that issue to arbitration.'" In Lodge
No. 822, International Association v. City of Quincy, 6 1 the union filed a
grievance with the city alleging the the city hired temporary employees in
order to circumvent the collective bargaining agreement, and the union then
sued in circuit court to compel the city to submit the matter to arbitration
in compliance with the collective bargaining agreement. The city argued that:
(1) temporary employees were not covered by the collective bargaining agree-
ment, and (2) the city's policy of hiring temporary employees to replace
permanent ones was therefore not an arbitrable matter.'"6 The appellate court
found that the collective bargaining agreement did not address the propriety
of hiring temporary employees' 67 and that it expressly reserved to the city all
powers not limited by the agreement.'" Furthermore, the arbitration clause
itself stated that the arbitrator could not modify the collective bargaining
agreement. 69 The court stated that regardless of the presumption in favor
of arbitration in labor disputes, the parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate
a dispute which they have not contracted to submit to arbitration. 70 There-
fore, disputes about hiring temporary employees were not arbitrable.',
In Bernard v. Kuhn,' 72 a shareholder's agreement provided for binding




163. Id. at 418, 701 S.W.2d at 101.
164. Lodge No. 822, Int'l Ass'n v. City of Quincy, 137 I11. App. 3d 425, 484
N.E.2d 464 (1985).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 426, 484 N.E.2d at 466.
167. Id. at 430, 484 N.E.2d at 467.




172. 65 Md. App. 557, 501 A.2d 480 (1985)
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that the losing party's responsibility for payment of the costs was to be
reflected in the arbitrator's decision. 73 The arbitrator, in contravention of
the agreement, also ordered that the arbitration costs be split between the
parties and that each party pay his own legal fees. 174 Following an application
to modify, the court found that "the allocation of costs was neither disputed
nor submitted to the arbitrator for resolution."' 17 Because the parties spe-
cifically provided for the payment of costs by the losing party in their ar-
bitration agreement, it was not within the discretion of the arbitrator to
render a contrary decision.176
C. Effect of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be employed
to preclude arbitration of a grievance. 177 In Monmouth Public Schools Dis-
trict No. 38 v. Pullen,'7 Pullen was on maternity leave for the first semester
of the 1981-82 school year. During the 1982-83 school year, Pullen filed a
grievance complaining that she was denied credit for the 1981-82 school year
on the salary schedule. The arbitrator concluded that the grievance had not
been timely filed. 79 During the 1983-84 school year, Pullen then filed another
grievance, making the same claim. The School District contended that this
second grievance was barred from arbitration by the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.'80 The court first declared that a court, not an ar-
bitration panel, is the appropriate tribunal to determine the res judicata and
collateral estoppel effect of a prior arbitration award.'" The court then con-
cluded that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do apply to
issues actually contested and decided in an earlier arbitration. 82 As a result,
Pullen was denied arbitration of her claim for 1983-1984.18
IV. COMPELLING AND STAYING PROCEEDINGS
A. Compelling Arbitration
Arbitration agreements, to be effective, must be enforceable against the
parties to the agreement. To achieve that end, courts order specific perform-
173. Id. at 560, 501 A.2d at 481.
174. Id. at 561, 501 A.2d at 482.
175. Id. at 563, 501 A.2d at 483.
176. Id.
177. Monmouth Public Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 141 Ill. App. 3d 60,
489 N.E.2d 1100 (1985).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 62, 489 N.E.2d at 1101.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 65, 489 N.E.2d at 1103.
182. Id. at 67, 489 N.E.2d at 1103-06.
183. A "specially concurring" opinion stated that even though res judicata
does prevent arbitrability of Pullen's claim, a more equitable result would be to treat
claims for separate years as separate causes of action. Id. at 70, 489 N.E.2d at 1107.
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ance of contractual arbitration agreements by compelling arbitration. Under
the UAA, a party may compel arbitration by showing the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate and the other party's refusal to arbitrate."'
1. Party Determination
An insured is not required to join both of its insurance carriers in a suit
to compel arbitration."' In Balarin v. Allstate Insurance Company,"' the
insured sought to compel arbitration on an underinsured motorist claim against
only one of its two underinsured motorist carriers. Upon the insured's refusal
to amend to add the second carrier, the trial court dismissed the complaint.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the insured was not required to
join the second underinsured motorist carrier as a necessary party." 7
A plaintiff is entitled to a second arbitration proceeding against a third
party if the third party was not indispensible to the first arbitration.18 In
Mitchell v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company,"' plaintiff
was denied recovery in a first arbitration proceeding against the driver of
the car with which he collided. Plaintiff then claimed that an unidentified
parked truck obstructed his view of the intersection where the accident hap-
pened, causing him to collide with the car. Consequently, the plaintiff sought
a second arbitration proceeding against Prudential, his uninsured motorist
carrier. Prudential argued that the driver of the unidentified parked truck
was an indispensable party and failure to join him in the first arbitration
precluded a second proceeding.19' The appellate court held that the driver of
the unidentified truck was not an indispensable party to the first arbitration
proceeding, as arbitration proceedings are not bound by the technical rules
of civil procedure unless the parties so provide in their arbitration agree-
ment.' 9'
2. Contract Determination
Arbitration will be compelled if there is no substantial issue as to the
agreement to arbitrate.1'2 In Beemik Builders & Constructors, Inc. v. Huber
184. UAA § 2.
185. Balarin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. App. 1986).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mitchell v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 346 Pa. Super. 327,
449 A.2d 632 (1985).
189. Id.
190. Id. at -, 449 A.2d at 633-34.
191. Id. at -, 449 A.2d at 636.
192. Beemik Builders & Construction, Inc. v. Huber Plumbing Inc., 476 So.
2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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Plumbing, Inc.193 a provision of the subcontract between the general con-
tractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration of all claims, disputes or
other questions arising out of or relating to the subcontract. When a dispute
arose, the general contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial
court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, holding that defendant
had failed to show that a substantial issue existed as to whether the agreement
to arbitrate was made."
19
B. Staying Judicial Proceedings
Any legal proceeding involving an arbitrable issue shall be stayed when
an order to compel arbitration has issued or when an application for such
an order has been made. 195 Therefore, an order compelling arbitration will
generally be accompanied by an order to stay legal proceedings pending the
outcome of the arbitration. If the legal proceeding includes issues unrelated
to the arbitration, those issues may be severed, with the stay applying only
to the arbitrable issues." 96
In Bishara v. Brown, Daltas & Associates,"7 the court held that the
extent of the factual issues in dispute precluded a stay of the proceedings. '"
In Bishara, an engineer for a construction project brought an action against
his employer on various tort and contract theories of recovery. The employer
filed a motion to stay the legal proceedings pending arbitration. Because
numerous factual issues relating to arbitrability were in dispute, it was unclear
whether arbitration was appropriate. 99 The trial court therefore denied the
motion for a stay, and the defendant employer appealed. The appellate court
noted that most commonly the facts relating to arbitrabiity will either be
undisputed or resolvable upon the filing of affidavits. 2° In Bishara, however,
193. Id.
194. Id. at 781.
195. UAA § 2(d) provides:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be
stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made
under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding,
the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
196. Id.
197. 21 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 486 N.E.2d 761 (1985).
198. Id.
199. Id. at -, 486 N.E.2d at 763. Factual issues in dispute included alle-
gations by plaintiff Bishara that the defendant had fired him without notice, coerced
him into dropping a complaint filed by him with an arbitration tribunal, unlawfully
withheld his identification card and threatened his life. In addition, it was unclear
whether the arbitration clause in Bishara's employment contract applied only to the
contract issues or applied to Bishara's tort claims as well. Id. at -, 486 N.E.2d
at 762-63.
200. Id. at -, 486 N.E.2d at 763.
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multiple issues remained unresolved, leaving the question of arbitrability
unanswered. The court held that further clarification of the facts would be
necessary before a decision to grant or deny the motion to stay could be
made.20' The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion
to stay judicial proceedings, 2°0
In Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1,203 the court held that when
arbitrable and nonarbitrable issues become so interrelated as to adversely
affect a complete resolution of the dispute, then the trial court is within its
discretion to stay .the entire proceeding pending arbitration.Y This is true
even though the issues might otherwise be deemed severable.M Plaintiff had
entered into a joint venture agreement with the defendants. The agreement
contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, plaintiff made several loans
to the defendants and made additional investments. Plaintiff later brought
an action alleging, among other things, that the defendants had made false
representations to induce investments, misapplied assets, and fraudulently
concealed information. In their answer, the defendants asserted their right
to arbitration and filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay all other
proceedings. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court affirmed, stating that although some of the claims did
not fall under the arbitration agreement, each claim was so interrelated with
the others that it could not be resolved independently. " 7 In reaching its
decision, the appellate court stressed both the need for judicial economy20
and the favored status of arbitration.as a means to resolve disputes.2 9
C. Staying Arbitration
The UAA provides that a court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened if there is a showing that there is no agreement
to arbitrate. 2 0 If there is a substantial and bona fide dispute as to the ex-
istence of an agreement to arbitrate, the court will summarily try the issue
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 142 Ill. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
204. Id. at 538, 491 N.E.2d at 1326.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 535, 491 N.E.2d at 1322.
207. Id. at 540, 491 N.E.2d at 1327.
208. Id. at 538, 491 N.E.2d at 1326.
209. Id. at 536, 491 N.E.2d at 1325.
210. UAA § 2.
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and either order the stay, or alternatively, order the parties to proceed to
arbitration.2
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may provide the
basis for an order staying arbitration. In Monmouth Public School, District
No. 38 v. Pullen,212 the school district filed an action seeking a permanent
stay of a pending grievance arbitration. The school district asserted that the
grievance had already been arbitrated and that a second arbitration pro-
ceeding was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court held




Parties may specify in their arbitration agreement the procedures to be
used in their arbitration hearing. 214 If the agreement does not set forth pro-
cedures, Section Five of the UAA describes the procedures to be used. 21 5
In Pennsylvania Social Services Union v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole,2 6 the court held that the exclusionary
rule of evidence is not applicable in arbitration proceedings. 2 7 The court set
forth three reasons for the rule's inapplicability. First, the court noted that
the exclusionary rule is a remedy, not a right, and traditionally has been
211. Id.
212. 141 Ill. App. 3d 60, 489 N.E.2d 1100 (1985).
213. Id. at 69-70, 489 N.E.2d at 1106.
214. UAA § 5.
215. UAA § 5 provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
(a) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and cause
notification to the parties to be served personally or by registered mail not
less than five days before the hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives
such notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as
necessary and, on request of a party and for good cause, or upon their own
motion may postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by
the agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later
date. The arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the
evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to
appear. The court on application may direct the arbitrators to proceed
promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy.
(b) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the
controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
(c) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators but a majority may
determine any question and render a final award. If, during the course of
the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining ar-
bitrator or arbitrators appointed to act as neutrals may continue with the
hearing and determination of the controversy.
216. 93 Pa. Commw. 272, 508 A.2d 360 (1986).
217. Id. at ___ 508 A.2d at 364.
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available only in criminal proceedings. 2 8 Second, the court stated that the
law in the area of unreasonable searches and seizures is too complex to expect
arbitrators to apply it.219 Third, using a cost-benefit analysis, the court held
that the minimal deterrent effect on the police resulting from the possibility
of having evidence excluded at a labor arbitration proceeding is greatly out-
weighed by the potential cost of applying the exclusionary rule.22°
In Mitchell v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company,221
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the rules of compulsory joinder
of parties do not apply in arbitration proceedings."M In Mitchell, appellant
was involved in an automobile accident and went to arbitration with the
driver of the other car. The arbitration panel rendered an award against
appellant. Appellant then sought another arbitration hearing under his un-
insured motorist policy, asserting that a parked truck had been the cause of
the accident. Respondent insurance company contended that the unidentified
owner of the parked truck was an indispensable party, and that failure to
join him in the first arbitration precluded a second proceeding. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the formal rules of civil procedure do
not apply to arbitration proceedings. 22 The parties to an arbitration agree-
ment are free to provide in their agreement for compulsory joinder, but if
they fail to do so, the court will not read the requirement into their agree-
ment.?'
In Endicott Education Association v. Endicott School Dist. ,,22 the court
refused to limit an arbitrator's award to what was requested in the com-
plaint. 6 The arbitrator awarded monetary compensation to the plaintiff-
schoolteacher because she had been denied her preparation period during the
school day. The School District contested the award on the ground that the
arbitrator had exceeded his authority by awarding monetary damages as the
plaintiff had not requested them in her original complaint. 227 The court de-
218. Id. at , 508 A.2d at 363.
219. Id. at __, 508 A.2d at 364.
220. Id. at , 508 A.2d at 364. In this case, the appellant was hired by the
state Board of Probation and Parole to work with paroled convicts and subsequently
began dealing drugs to them. If the evidence were excluded, there would be no means
of recourse for the state. Id. The court noted that the appellant still had a possible
cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any damages resulting from
an illegal search and seizure. Id.
221. 346 Pa. Super. 327, 499 A.2d 632 (1985).
222. Id. at -, 499 A.2d at 636.
223. Id.
224. The court noted that even had they followed the formal compulsory join-
der rule, the unidentified driver would not have fallen within its provisions. Id.
225. 43 Wash. App. 392, 717 P.2d 763 (1986).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 394, 717 P.2d at 765-66. The Court of Appeals found that the
School District was not denied notice and opportunity to present evidence on the
issue of damages because the alleged breach of the contract was sufficient notice to
the District. Id.
24
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clined to limit the remedies available to the arbitrator. The court stated that
the only limits on an arbitrator's award are "those of his creativity subject
to the bounds of [the law] . . . and the negotiated contract.9 22 8
In Austin v. R. L. Stovall, "9 the court held that when a party violates
the procedure set forth in the arbitration act for appointing an arbitrator,
the award may be declared a nullity. 2 0 In Austin, respondent unilaterally
dismissed the arbitrator initially chosen by the parties and appointed a new
one without the consent of appellant. Appellant did not participate in pro-
ceedings before the new arbitrator. The court held that under Florida law,
both the proceedings and the award were nullities because respondent's ac-




Generally, arbitrators are shielded by immunity. 232 The court in Grane
v. Grane,'23 however, held that arbitral immunity does not attach if there is
not a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. In Grane, the parties
had provided in their contract that Thomas Boodell would be the arbitrator
in the event that a dispute arose. It was plaintiff's contention, however, that
Boodell himself had fraudulently induced plaintiff into entering into the
arbitration agreement. Plaintiff sued for rescission of the contract and sued
Boodell for fraudulent inducement.2 3 4 The court held that Boodell was not
immune to suit, absent a valid arbitration agreement.23
In Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon,236
the court held that the procedures described in Section Five of the UAA may
be used in grievance arbitration hearings under Pennsylvania Act 111,237
which controls collective bargaining for police and firefighters. 238 While Sec-
tion Five of the UAA is not controlling under Act 111, the court found no
reason why an interest arbitration board could not adopt Section Five pro-
cedures for its grievance hearings.2 39
VI. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AwARDS
After an arbitrator's decision has been rendered, the prevailing party
will usually seek confirmation of the award by a trial court. A court must
228. Id. at 395, 717 P.2d at 763-64.
229. 475 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
230. Id. at 1015.
231. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.04, .13 (West 1986)).
232. Grane v. Grane, 143 Ill. App. 3d 979, 493 N.E.2d 1112 (1986).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 980-81, 493 N.E.2d at 1114.
235. Id. at 988, 493 N.E.2d at 1119.
236. 508 Pa. 495, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985).
237. The Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237 as amended, 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 217.1 to .10 (Purdon 1986).
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confirm an arbitration award upon application by a party unless the opposing
party presents sufficient grounds for modifying or vacating an awardYm
The UAA lists five independent grounds a party may use as the basis
for vacation of an award .24 The motion to vacate must set out with partic-
ularity one or more of the five specified grounds, and the burden for proving
grounds for vacation rests with the moving party.~2 Courts narrowly construe
grounds for vacation.ui
A. Misconduct and Partiality
An award may be vacated upon a showing of evident partiality by an
arbitrator, corruption in any of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of a party.2' A party seeking to vacate an award on the basis of
arbitrator misconduct must-prove the occurrence of the act which constituted
the misconduct, and prejudice to the party as a result.2" In an action to
vacate an award due to partiality, the moving party must prove facts beyond
mere speculationY' Such facts must be sufficient to permit an inference that
there was in fact partiality by an arbitrator. u 7
240. UAA § 11 states: Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm
an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for
vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed
as provided in Sections 12 and 13.
241. UAA § 12(a) provides:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or otherwise so conducted the h'aring, contrary to
the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate
in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted
by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.
242. Turner v. Nicholson Properties, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 708, -, 341 S.E.2d
42, 45 (1986).
243. Recent Developments 1984, supra note 4, at 255.
244. UAA § 12(a)(2).
245. Fort Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, 490 N.E.2d
337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
246. Wyndham v. Haines, 305 Md. 269, 279, 503 A.2d 719, 724-25 (1986).
247. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 725.
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In Littlejohn v. Keystone Ins. Co.,2"4 the court held that discussion of
a settlement agreement with the arbitrators did not constitute misconduct
under the Pennsylvania UAA. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had improperly
informed the arbitrators of the settlement that plaintiff recovered in a sep-
arate action against a third party driver. The court held that the standards
applicable at law concerning the disclosure of the settlement were controlling,
noting that the Pennsylvania no-fault act allowed a trier-of-fact to be in-
formed of a plaintiff's receipt of benefits which were in addition to those
for which he had instituted suit. 9 Since the no-fault act was in effect at the
time of the arbitration proceedings, the court affirmed the trial court's denial
of Littlejohx's motion to vacate the award, finding that discussion of plain-
tiff's settleyhent did not constitute misconduct. 250
In F rt Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Education Associ-
ation,25 1 the court held that the party seeking to have the award vacated must
show not only misconduct by the arbitrator, but must also affinatively show
that'the party was in fact prejudiced by the misconduct. A mere inference
of prejudice from the facts is insufficient.2 5 2 In Fort Wayne, the party seeking
to have the award vacated alleged that the arbitrator had slept during the
testimony of one of its expert witnesses.23 Noting that several other experts
had testified on the same topic and that the arbitrator's decision contained
material substantially similar to that contained in the expert's affidavit, the
court found that the party had failed to show how it had in fact been
prejudiced. 24
In Wyndham v. Haines,25 the court held that a party seeking vacation
of an award based upon partiality must prove evident partiality through facts
sufficient to permit an inference of partiality. 256 Wyndham, a medical mal-
practice claimant, filed a petition to vacate a Health Claims Arbitration
award alleging that the panel chairman failed to act in a neutral and impartial
manner. Subsequent to his appointment, the panel chairman had been re-
tained as private counsel to two different medical malpractice plaintiffs in
unrelated cases. The panel chairman's opposing counsel in the two cases was
also counsel to the defendant in the arbitration. Fearing that the panel chair-
man's desire to maintain good rapport with defense counsel in the settlement
of the two unrelated cases might influence his decision in the arbitration,
248. 353 Pa. Super. 63, 509 A.2d 334 (1986).
249. Id. at , 509 A.2d at 337.
250. Id. at , 509 A.2d at 337-38.
251. 490 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
252. Id. at 340.
253. Id. at 339.
254. Id. at 340.
255. 305 Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986).
256. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 725.
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Wyndham's counsel unsuccessfully sought disqualification of the panel chair-
man.257 The trial court denied Wyndham's petition to vacate the award,
finding no reason to believe that the chairman was biased or could not render
a fair and impartial decision.2 8 In affirming, the appellate court noted that
"[t]he establishment of 'evident partiality' requires more than speculation
and bald allegations of bias. The moving party must prove facts sufficient
to permit an inference that there was indeed partiality by an arbitrator. 2 59
In Turner v. Nicholson Properties,2" the court upheld confirmation of
an arbitrator's award despite evidence that the arbitrator had previously
appeared as an expert witness for opposing counsel's law firm.26' In Turner,
Turner filed for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association pur-
suant to an arbitration agreement with Nicholson Properties, and the parties
selected a mutually agreeable arbitrator. Thereafter, Turner obtained counsel.
The arbitrator had previously appeared as an expert witness for Turner's
counsel's law firm. The arbitrator informed the Association of the previous
dealings with Turner's counsel. The Association assessed the situation and
determined that the arbitrator was qualified to serve impartially.20 The ar-
bitrator issued an award in favor of Turner. Nicholson Properties moved to
vacate the arbitrator's award on the grounds that the arbitrator was biased.
The court held that the arbitrator's indirect association with Turner's counsel
was correctly labeled by the Association as neither current, continuing nor
substantial. Thus, the arbitrator was qualified to make an impartial assess-
ment of the dispute. 2"
B. Arbitrators Exceeded Their Powers
Arbitrators' powers are defined by the arbitration agreement. An award
may be vacated upon a showing that the arbitrators exceeded their powers.2"
In Hetrick v. Weimer,20 the court held that the arbitrators did not exceed
their powers by issuing an award against a party who had settled with the
claimant prior to arbitration. In Hetrick, the claimant alleged that an ob-
stetrician, a pediatrician and a hospital were liable for malpractice. The
claimant settled with the obstetrician prior to the arbitration hearing. The
arbitrators, however, found that the obstetrician was solely liable.2" The
257. Id. at 277-78, 503 A.2d at 724.
258. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724.
259. Id. at 279, 503 A.2d at 724-25.
260. 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42 (1986).
261. Id. at __ 341 S.E.2d at 44.
262. Id. at __ 341 S.E.2d at 43.
263. Id. at , 341 S.E.2d at 44.
264. UAA § 12(a)(3).
265. 67 Md. App. 522, 508 A.2d 522 (1986).
266. Id. at 528, 508 A.2d at 525.
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claimant moved to vacate the award, arguing that an award against the
obstetrician alone was beyond the scope of the arbitrators' authority. 267 The
appellate court held that although the award was unnecessary because the
claimant had previously settled with the obstetrician, it was not beyond the
arbitrators' authority. 268
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Wise,269 the court held that the
arbitrator did not exceed his power in awarding punitive damages. In State
Farm, the arbitrator awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The
insured moved for confirmation of the award. State Farm then attempted
to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
as the insurance policy contained no provision for punitive damages. 270 The
court held that since punitive damages were not specifically excluded by the
policy, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority.27'
An arbitrator will not be held to have exceeded his powers if he has
based his decision on proper grounds. 272 In Missouri Mining, Inc. v. St.
Joseph Light & Power Co.,273 a dispute arose between the parties over a
contract to supply coal. The contract provided that the mining company was
to supply coal with a sulfur content of less than 3.5 percent to the power
company. After consistently receiving coal that fell below contract standards,
the power company refused to accept future coal shipments from the mining
company. Pursuant to an earlier agreement, arbitration commenced in order
to determine whether the mining company had failed to perform pursuant
to the contract. Evidence of both excessive sulfur content and excessive sulfur
dioxide emission levels was received by the arbitrator. After receiving a fa-
vorable decision, the power company moved to have the arbitration award
confirmed by a trial court. The mining company moved for vacation of the
award contending that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by basing the award
on excessive sulfur dioxide emissions when the proper focus of arbitration
should have been the excessive sulfur content of the coal. The court of
appeals affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.2 ' The court agreed
that had the arbitrator based his decision on excessive sulfur dioxide emissions
he would have exceeded his powers. 27 However, there was sufficient evidence
that the arbitration award was correctly based upon the excessive sulfur
content of the coal.
276
267. Id. at 530-32, 508 A,2d at 526-27.
268. Id.
269. 150 Ariz. 16, 721 P.2d 674 (1986).
270. Id. at - , 721 P.2d at 675.
271. Id.
272. Missouri Mining, Inc. v. St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 703 S.W.2d 94
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
273. Id.
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In South Conejos School District v. Martinez,2" the court held that when
a collective bargaining agreement gave the arbitrator the power to decide the
issue of arbitrability, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in deciding
that issue. Martinez had been employed by the school district as an instructor
for about six years when he was granted sabbatical leave for one year. When
he returned, the school district refused to reinstate him. Martinez filed a
grievance relying on the agreement between the school district and the teach-
ers' association which stated that teachers on sabbatical leave were guaranteed
a position when they returned."' The arbitrator found in favor of Martinez,
and the district court affirmed the award.27 The school district appealed
alleging the arbitrator had exceeded his powers by finding Martinez was an
"employee" under the agreement; if Martinez was not an employee, the
matter was not arbitrable.m The appellate court rejected the school district's
allegation because the collective bargaining agreement contained a provision
that gave the arbitrator power to decide the question of arbitrability.28 The
court also held the arbitrator did not exceed his powers by finding Martinez
to be an "employee" under the agreement as the arbitrator restricted his
findings to interpretation and application of the agreement.m
C. Refusal to Hear Material Evidence
An award may be vacated upon a showing of refusal by the arbitrator
to hear evidence material to the controversy.23 In Farm Construction Service,
Inc. v. Robinson,2" defendant alleged that the arbitrator had refused to hear
expert rebuttal evidence, but the court found no factual foundation for
defendant's allegation in the record.m The court relied on the uncontested
averments of the arbitrators that: "(1) there was no expert evidence which
would have been the proper subject of rebuttal and (2) no offer of proof
was made describing the proposed expert rebuttal evidence.' '2
D. No Arbitration Agreement
If no arbitration agreement exists, arbitrators have no authority to re-
solve disputes. An award may be vacated upon a showing that an arbitrator
made an award in absence of an arbitration agreement.-
277. 709 P.2d 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).




282. Id. at 595-96.
283. UAA § 12(a)(4).
284. 21 Mass. App. 955, 487 N.E.2d 873 (1986).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. UAA § 12(a)(5).
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In Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,88 the court held that while
the plaintiff had agreed to adhere to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
(CME) arbitration rules, these rules did not establish a mandatory arbitration
agreement. 2 9 Plaintiff was asked to submit to arbitration after a contract
dispute arose with another CME member. Plaintiff informed CME that he
would not submit to the jurisdiction of the arbitration committee. The ar-
bitration committee scheduled a hearing, and plaintiff informed CME that
he would not appear. Following the hearing, the committee entered an award
against plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action in state court to vacate the award
and enjoin its collection. The court held that persons not parties to a valid
arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration. 290 When
plaintiff became a member of CME, he had signed an agreement to abide
by all the rules, orders, and bylaws. The court, however, found that arbi-
tration had not been made compulsory under the express terms of the rules. 29'
Therefore, the court vacated the arbitrator's award on the basis that there
was no agreement to arbitrate. 292
In Elbadramany v. Stanley,293 the court held that bylaws of a voluntary
association constituted an arbitration agreement between members. In El-
badramany, two real estate brokers were in dispute over a commission. Both
brokers were members of a local Board of Realtors (Board). The Board's
bylaws required professional disputes between members to be submitted to
arbitration. Therefore, when the dispute arose, Elbadramany moved for ar-
bitration pursuant to the Board's bylaws. Stanley participated in the hearing
but refused to sign a form entitled "Arbitration Agreement." After the
arbitrators entered an award for Elbadramany, Stanley moved to vacate the
award. The trial court vacated the arbitration award because Stanley had
failed to sign the "Arbitration Agreement.""' The appellate court reversed,
concluding it was not necessary for Stanley to sign the "Arbitration Agree-
ment" because the Board's bylaws constituted a sufficient arbitration agree-
ment. 291 The court held that "a provision in the constitution, charter or
bylaws of a voluntary association which requires that disputes between mem-
bers be submitted to arbitration constitutes a binding agreement between
such members to submit future disputes to arbitration."
'2 ' 6
In Hot Springs County School District v. Strube Construction Co., "97 the
288. 141 Ill. App. 3d 129, 490 N.E.2d 39 (1986).




293. 490 So.2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
294. Id. at 965.
295. Id. at 966.
296. Id.
297. 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986).
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court held that participation in the arbitration process constituted a waiver
of the right to raise the issue of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
In Hot Springs, the parties participated in arbitration proceedings. Both par-
ties later moved to vacate the award, arguing that there was no agreement
to arbitrate.29 ' The court held that their participation in the arbitration pro-
cess constituted a waiver of their right to dispute the existence of an arbitra-
tion agreement. 9"
E. Errors of Fact or Law
Courts presume that arbitrators have considered relevant law in render-
ing their awards.30 In Pierce v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Com-
pany,30' an insurer contended that the arbitrator's award was based on an
error of law in that the panel had failed to apply the setoff provision of the
state no-fault statute in its award. The insured had previously collected eco-
nomic loss benefits under his policy and was seeking to collect under the
uninsured motorist provision of the same policy. The court ruled that the
setoff provision of the state no-fault statute did apply to arbitration awards,
but refused to disturb the award of the arbitrators.m The court stated that
since there was evidence that the panel was aware of the prior payments to
the insured, the panel must have considered the amount of setoff allowable
before arriving at its award.3
Absent fraud, an error of fact or law is not a ground for vacating an
arbitrator's award. 3 In School Committee of Quincy v. Quincy Education
Association," the union sought arbitration of a grievance concerning the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator ruled in
favor of the School Committee. The superior court, however, vacated the
award and remanded on the grounds that the arbitrator had incorrectly in-
terpreted the collective bargaining agreement. On remand, the arbitrator ruled
in favor of the union. The School Committee then filed an application to
set the award aside, and the union filed a motion to confirm the award. A
different superior court vacated the second award. On appeal, the court held
that the superior court erred in vacating the arbitrator's first award.31 The
court stated that the arbitrator's first award was based on a reasonable
298. Id.
299. Id. at 546.
300. Pierce v. Midwest Family Mutual Ins. Co., 390 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 361.
303. Id.
304. School Comm. of Quincy v. Quincy Educ. Ass'n, 22 Mass. App. 914,
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interpretation of the agreement.3 07 The court held that even if the interpre-
tation had been wrong, the arbitrator's decision must stand, as courts may
not pass on an arbitrator's alleged errors of fact or law.
3 08
In contrast, in Patrick v. Cherokee Insurance Co., 309 the court stated
that under Pennsylvania law, an award may be vacated as contrary to law
when it is such that if it had been the verdict of a jury, the court could have
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 3"° In Patrick, the company
contended that the arbitration panel had disregarded an endorsement that
the company said was part of the insured's policy. The endorsement would
have invalidated the uninsured motorist provision of the policy and relieved
the company of responsibility in the suit. The court, however, found the
endorsement was unsigned and therefore, was not a part of the policy, and
the arbitrators had not erred in disregarding the clause.31
F. Award Would Not Have Been Granted by a Court
The fact that an award could not or would not have been granted by a
court is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. "' In
Prudential-Bache Securities v. Shuman,"' the defendant attempted to vacate
an award by alleging that the award was excessive under substantive law.
314
In Prudential-Bache, an investor won an arbitration award for damages re-
sulting from improper investments made on his behalf by the defendant
investment company. The court ruled that even though the award may have
been less if determined by a court of law or equity, the arbitrator's award
would stand unless the complaining party could demonstrate bias or prejudice
on behalf of the arbitrators.3"'
VII. MODIFICATION OF AwARDs
The UAA sets forth specific statutory grounds for modification or cor-
rection of an arbitrator's award by the court.3 6 Absent one of the required
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 354 Pa. Super. 427, 512 A.2d 24 (1986).
310. Id. at - , 512 A.2d at 25, citing the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act, 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(d)(2) (Purdon 1982). The UAA does not contain a
parallel provision.
311. Id. at -, 512 A.2d at 27.
312. UAA § 12(a).
313. 483 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
314. Id. at 889.
315. Id.
316. UAA § 13(a) provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of
33
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grounds, a court generally will not disturb an arbitrator's award.
A. Miscalculation of Figures
A court will grant modification where there is an evident miscalculation
of figures in the award. 317 In Althoff, Inc. v. IFG Leasing Co.,'" a diesel
truck lessor sought modification to increase its award, claiming that the
arbitrator erroneously counted an item twice to the lessee's credit in deter-
mining the amount awarded. The court expressed its reluctance to disturb
an arbitration award, but held this to be a situation where the Arbitration
Act required modification, 1 9 as there had been an "evident miscalculation
of figures."' 31
B. Award Upon a Matter Not Submitted
An award will be modified if the arbitrators awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them. 32' In Champion International Corp. v. United Paper-
workers International Union,m the union filed a seniority grievance and a
scheduling grievance against the company. The seniority grievance was with-
drawn prior to the arbitration. The arbitrator, however, ruled in favor of
the union on the withdrawn grievance.32 On appeal, the court held that it
was clear that the arbitrator had ruled on a matter not submitted when he
ruled on the withdrawn grievance. 324 Therefore, modification of the award
was required.32
In Bernard v. Kuhn,32 the parties entered into a compensation stipu-
lation prior to arbitration which provided that the losing party would pay
the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award
where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in
the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon
the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
317. UAA § 13(aX).
318. 704 P.2d 1302 (Wyo. 1985).
319. Id. at 1304 (citing Wyo. STAT. § 1-36-115 (1977)).
320. Id. at 1305.
321. UAA § 13(a)(2).
322. 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1985).
323. Id. at 330-31.
324. Id. at 335.
325. Id.
326. 65 Md. App. 557, 501 A.2d 480 (1985).
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the arbitrator's fees. The arbitrator, however, ordered both parties to share
the fees, as well as other costs involved in the arbitration. The court held
that modification of the award was proper because the issue of payment of
arbitration fees was never submitted to the arbitrator. 27
C. Award in Conflict with a Statute
A court has the authority to modify an award on the ground that the
award conflicts with a state statute only if state law so provides. 28 In Upper
Bucks County Area Vocational-Technical School Joint Committee v. Upper
Bucks County Vocational Technical School Education Association. ,329 the
Committee and the Association engaged in collective bargaining after the
Association had been on strike for 16 instructional days. The Committee
approved a calendar for the school year providing 188 days of student in-
struction. The days lost due to the strike were not made up leaving only 172
instruction days in the school year. The Association sought a declaratory
judgment requiring the Committee to operate its school for 180 days in
accordance with the Public School Code. 33 The lower court dismissed the
action, and the Association filed a grievance seeking back pay for sixteen
days-eight days for the Committee's failure to provide 180 days as required
by law and eight days for the Committee's failure to reschedule as required
by the 188 day calendar. 33' The arbitrator awarded the Association back pay
for the eight additional days required to meet the 180 day statutory require-
ment by interpreting the agreement to preclude conflicts with any statutory
provision.332 On appeal, the Committee contended the 180 day rule of the
Public School Code did not guarantee teachers a salary for 180 days. 333 The
appeals court noted that its review of an arbitrator's decision requires af-
firmation if the arbitrator determines the intention of the parties as evidenced
by their agreement and surrounding circumstances. 3' However, if the arbi-
trator's award conflicts with state law, the court has express statutory au-
thority to review and correct or modify the award. 33 Finding the arbitrator
awarded the teachers an additional eight days' pay by interpreting the agree-
ment to preclude conflicts with any statute, the Committee was required to
327. Id. at 565-66, 501 A.2d at 484.
328. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Joint Comm. v. Upper
Bucks County Vocational Technical School Educ. Ass'n, 91 Pa. Commw. 463, 497
A.2d 943 (1985).
329. Id.
330. Id. at -, 497 A.2d at 944 n.).
331. Id. at -, 497 A.2d at 944.
332. Id. at -, 497 A.2d at 945.
333. Id.
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comply with the mandatory 180 day requirement set out in the Public School
Code.3 6
D. Procedural Issues
A party may be estopped from enforcing a trial de novo provision in
an arbitration agreement where the party previously attempted to modify the
award. In Pierce v. Midwest Family Mutual Ins. Co.,"1' Pierce attempted to
claim benefits under the underinsured motorist provision of his automobile
insurance policy. Pursuant to an agreement in the insurance policy, the matter
was submitted to arbitration. After receiving a favorable arbitration award,
Pierce moved to have the award confirmed by a trial court. Midwest moved
to modify the award. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and
denied Midwest's motion to modify. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement
Midwest then moved for a trial de novo and vacation of the trial court's
judgment. The trial court denied both motions. The appellate court affirmed,
holding that Midwest was estopped from using the trial de novo provision
of the policy because it had earlier moved to modify the award.338 The court
reasoned that enforcement of the provision would allow Midwest three op-
portunities to gain a favorable result: arbitration, motion to modify or vacate,
and trial de novo. To allow such a result would hinder the ultimate purpose
of arbitration: "the voluntary, speedy, informal and relatively inexpensive
resolution of disputes." 3 9
VIII. Twm LIMrTATIONS ON MOTIONS TO VACATE OR MODIFY
The UAA provides that if a party seeks to have an arbitration award
modified ' " or vacated,"' it must make application to the courts within 90
days after the award is made. The time period begins with the delivery of a
copy of the award to the applicant. 42 If the award is being challenged because
of "corruption, fraud, or other undue means," however, the time period for
filing a motion to vacate begins from the time "such grounds are known or
should have been known." ' 43 If a party fails to challenge the award during
the statutory period, it waives the right to later object to the award. If a
challenge is being made to the arbitrator's jurisdiction over a dispute, the
336. Id.
337. 390 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
338. Id. at 362-63.
339. Id.
340. UAA § 13(a).
341. UAA § 12(b).
342. UAA § 12(b), 13(a).
343. UAA § 12(b).
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challenging party must comply with the time limitation.3" If, however, the
award is being challenged on the basis that the arbitration proceeding was
void, the limitation period will not be enforced.3 4
In the past, some courts have been hesitant to apply the UAA's limi-
tations period in disputes involving the National Labor Management Rela-
tions Act3 " (NLMRA).34 7 Recently, however, some federal courts have shown
a disposition toward borrowing the forum state's arbitration statute to de-
termine the time limitations on a motion to vacate or modify an arbitrator's
decision. 3"
If a party fails to object to an arbitrator's award within the 90-day
statutory time period, that party may waive any right to challenge the award.
In Walter A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan,349 Brown had contracted with Moylan
to serve as managing agent for a residence owned by Moylan.3 10 The contract
provided that any dispute between the parties would be resolved by arbitra-
tion.35' As a result of Brown's subsequent mismanagement of the property,
Moylan filed a demand for arbitration. 312 After the arbitrator decided in
Moylan's favor, Moylan petitioned the superior court for confirmation of
the award. 3 3 Brown did not file an answer to the petition until 107 days
after the delivery of the award. 354 In affirming the lower court's decision,
the appellate court held that since Brown had failed to object within the 90-
day statutory time period, the award could not be challenged.3 55
In Russell H. Lankton Construction Company v. LaHood3 16 plaintiff
contractor won an arbitration award which required defendant make full
payment of the award within fifteen days of issuance of a Final Certificate
of Payment from an Architect. 3 7 Issuance of the certificate, which assured
344. Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 397
Mass. 426, 491 N.E.2d 1053 (1986); Burt v. Duval County School Bd., 481 So. 2d
55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
345. Austin v. Stovall, 475 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
346. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
347. See DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983);
Barnett v. United Airlines, 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1984); Hand v. Int'l Chemical
Workers Union, 712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
348. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328
(6th Cir. 1985); Plumber's Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas Mechanical
Contractors, 778 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1985); Gencorp, Inc. v. Local 850, United
Rubber, 622 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. N.C. 1985).
349. 509 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1986).
350. Id. at 98.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 99.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 100.
355. Id.
356. 143 Ill. App. 3d 806, 493 N.E.2d 714 (1986).
357. Id. at - , 493 N.E.2d at 715.
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that plaintiff had fulfilled his duties under the contract with defendant, was
a condition precedent to defendant's obligation to pay the arbitrator's award.
Over a year later, plaintiff filed for judgment on the award. The lower court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, characterizing it as an application
for modification which was not filed within the requisite period under the
Illinois Arbitration Act.35 The appellate court affirmed, stating in dicta that
characterizing a complaint as an application for modification invokes the
Arbitration Act's 90-day provision.3"'
Failure to file a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award within
the 90-day statutory time period may cause the arbitration award to become
the law of the case. 3" In Sentry Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Mar-
iner's Cay Development Corporation,36' Sentry and Mariner's entered into a
building contract which contained an arbitration clause.m When Sentry be-
came concerned about payment, it filed a mechanic's lien against Mariner's
for balances due under the contract. 363 Sentry submitted the dispute to ar-
bitration, and simultaneously filed a petition in a circuit court to foreclose
its lien. 36 The court ordered arbitration of all disputes concerning the building
contract.3 After the arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Sentry, the
circuit court entered a judgment upon the award and granted summary judg-
ment on Sentry's lien foreclosure petition.3" Mariner's had failed to file a
motion to vacate or modify within the 90-day time period, and thus had
waived its right to object to the arbitration award.367
A superior court in Pennsylvania held that a challenge to an arbitration
award made after Pennsylvania's 30-day statutory time period was un-
timely. 368 In Beriker v. Permagrain Products, Inc.,m9 a dispute arose between
the parties. Permagrain submitted the dispute to arbitration but Beriker main-
tained that there had been no agreement to arbitrate. Beriker brought an
action in the court of common pleas seeking to enjoin the arbitration, but
injunctive relief was denied. At the arbitration hearing the arbitrators found
that there had been an agreement to arbitrate, and then entered an award
358. Id.
359. Id. at - , 493 N.E.2d at 716.
360. Sentry Engineering & Construction Co. v. Mariner's Cay Dev. Corp., 287
S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
361. Id.




366. Id. at __, 338 S.E.2d at 633.
367. Id. at -' 338 S.E.2d at 634.
368. Pennsylvania provides a 30-day time period in which to challenge an
award, as opposed to the 90-day limit of UAA § 12(b), 13(a). PA. CONS. STAT. §
7342(b) (1980).
369. 347 Pa. Super. 102, 500 A.2d 178 (1985).
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in favor of Beriker. Beriker then filed a motion to confirm the award in the
trial court. Permagrain filed an answer to Beriker's petition three months
after the date of the arbitrator's decision. The trial court confirmed the
arbitration award, holding that Permagrain was too late in filing its petition
to challenge the arbitration award."70 On appeal the superior court affirmed,
holding that any challenges to the arbitrator's decision had to be made during
the 30-day state statutory period following the delivery of the awardY The
court held that after 30 days had elapsed, the trial court was obligated to
confirm the award upon a motion by either party. 72
Challenges to an arbitrator's jurisdiction to enter an award must be
made within the statutory time period for contesting the award.37 In Burt
v. Duval County School Board,74 a dispute arose when Duval County school
teachers accused the Board of failing to notify the teachers of their respon-
sibility to provide verification of past experience, which is needed for com-
putation of salary schedules. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, and
the arbitrator decided in favor of the teachers. Subsequently, the teachers
filed a motion in circuit court to confirm the arbitrator's award. The court
rejected the award, finding that the dispute was beyond the scope of the
current contract. 73 On appeal, however, the district court held that the dis-
pute was covered by the contract and was, therefore, arbitrable . 76 In addi-
tion, the district court found that the Board had waived its right to object
to the arbitrator's jurisdiction in any event, because the Board had failed to
object within 90 days of the arbitrator's award.3 77
In Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Trans-
portation Authority,"8 a dispute arose between Massachusetts Bay Transit
Authority (MBTA) and Local 589 (the union) when MBTA contracted with
a private company to perform a reconstruction project.379 The union, which
believed that the work should be done by union employees, submitted the
dispute to arbitration. 30 The arbitrator found in favor of the union.3 81 When
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. A party may apply for confirmation of an award more than thirty days
after the award has been made. The court "shall enter an order confirming the award
and shall enter a judgment or decree in conformity with the order." PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7342(b) (1980). The court in Beriker interpreted the word "shall" as man-
dating that unless a party has challenged the award during the 30-day period, the
court is obligated to confirm. 347 Pa. Super. at -, 500 A.2d at 179.
373. FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (1983).
374. 481 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
375. Id. at 56.
376. Id. at 58.
377. Id.
378. 397 Mass. 426, 491 N.E.2d 1053 (1986).
379. Id. at -, 491 N.E.2d at 1054.
380. Id.
381. Id. at -, 491 N.E.2d at 1055.
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MBTA refused to comply with the award, the union brought an action in
superior court to enforce the award.82 MBTA asserted in its answer that the
arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to make the award. 3 3 The court held that the
arbitrator did lack jurisdiction, and therefore set the award aside.318 On
appeal, the court found that the award should be reinstated since MBTA
had failed to file a motion to vacate, within the statutory time period. 33 The
court held that there should be no judicial exceptions to the statutory time
limitation. 3U In so holding, the court declined to follow Painters Local No.
257 v. Johnson Industrial Painting Contractors.3 7 In Painters Local, the
court held that a motion to vacate based upon jurisdictional grounds was
not subject to the time period limitation.38 The court in Amalgamated, how-
ever, stated that since the legislature had chosen not to make any exceptions
to the statutory time limitation period, the courts should not create one.389
If an entire award is being attacked because of a void arbitration pro-
ceeding, it is not necessary to make a motion to vacate within the statutory
time period. 390 In Austin v. Stovall, 391 a dispute between Austin and Stovall
as to money owed under a subcontract on a construction project was sub-
mitted to arbitration.39 When Stovall objected to the choice of arbitrator,
he unilaterally dismissed that arbitrator and chose another before whom the
arbitration proceedings were conducted. 39 Austin refused to participate in
the proceedings, so the arbitration hearing was held without him.19" The
arbitrator issued an award in favor of Stovall which was later confirmed in
circuit court.3" On appeal, however, the district court reversed, holding that




385. Id. at -, 491 N.E.2d at 1057. This case was decided based upon the
statute governing collective bargaining agreements which has a 30-day limitation pe-
riod. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 150(C), § 11(b) (1984). However, the statute is virtually
identical to that of commercial arbitration. MASS GEN L. ch. 251, § 12(b) (1984).
See Local 589, Amalgamated, 397 Mass. at n.2, 491 N.E.2d at 1056 n.2.
386. Local 589, Amalgamated, 397 Mass. at - , 491 N.E.2d at 1056.
387. 16 Mass. Ct. App. 67, 448 N.E.2d 1307 (1983).
388. Id. at - , 448 N.E.2d at 1310.
389. Local 589, Amalgamated, 397 Mass. at -, 491 N.E.2d at 1056.
390. The statutory time period for vacating an award in Florida is 90 days.
FLA. STAT. § 682.13 (1983).
391. 475 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
392. Id. at 1015, n. 2.
393. Id. The appropriate method of appointing an arbitrator is set out in FLA.
STAT. § 682.04 (1983). If the agreement does not provide for a method of appointing
an arbitrator or if for some reason the arbitrator cannot serve, the court on application
of one of the parties will appoint one.
394. Austin, 475 So. 2d at 1015.
395. Id.
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tration proceeding void. 39 ' Therefore, Austin's failure to make a timely mo-
tion to vacate, as normally required, did not preclude his attack on the entire
award.3 97
A federal district court in North Carolina398 held that the UAA's ninety
day limitations period for filing a motion to vacate an arbitrator's award3'9
should be applied to disputes involving Section 301 of the National Labor
Management Relations Act. 00 In so doing, the court reached a different
conclusion than have other courts addressing the issue. 0 In Gencorp, Inc.
v. Local 850, United Rubber,'0 2 defendant Gencorp discharged two of its
employees. The dispute was submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agree-
ment, whereupon the arbitrator determined that the employees should be
reinstated. 03 Ninety days later, Gencorp filed a petition in federal court to
vacate the arbitration decision on the grounds that the arbitrator refused to
consider Gencorp's evidence on a particular issue.404 Citing various author-
ities,'40 the Gencorp court noted that since no federal statute of limitations
specifically applies to Section 301 of the NLRA, "the timeliness of such a
suit [to vacate an arbitration award] is to be governed by the most closely
analogous statute of limitations under state law."'4' The plaintiff employees
argued that North Carolina's Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes
Statute,'407 which has a ten day limit, is the most analogous statute of limi-
tations because it is intended to cover labor disputes. 40 In arguing for the
ten day period, plaintiffs contended that, unlike the UAA,409 North Caroli-
na's Arbitration Ac40 specifically states that it is inapplicable to agreements
between employers and employees, unless the agreement says otherwise.'' If
plaintiffs had succeeded in this argument, defendant's application to vacate
would have been barred by the ten day time limit because the motion was
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Gencorp, Inc. v. Local 850, United Rubber, 622 F.Supp. 216 (W.D. N.C.
1985).
399. UAA § 12(b).
400. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
401. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983); Barnett v.
United Airlines, 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1984); Hand v. Int'l Chemical Workers
Union, 712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
402. Gencorp, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 216.
403. Id. at 217.
404. Id.
405. DelCostello, 462 U.S. 151; Int'l Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966).
406. Gencorp, Inc., 622 F. Supp. at 217.
407. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-36.9 (1983).
408. Gencorp, Inc., 622 F.Supp. at 218.
409. UAA§ 1.
410. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 (1983).
411. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(b)(2) (1983).
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not filed until ninety days after the arbitrator's decision. In rejecting plain-
tiffs' argument, the court concentrated not on the underlying dispute (i.e.,
the employment contract), but rather on the absence of a statutory limitations
period concerning arbitration appeals within the NLRA.42 The language of
the UAA section dealing with vacating awards provides for vacation of an
arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy.43 Since Gencorp's motion to vacate was based
upon the arbitrator's refusal to consider material evidence,4 " the court held
the UAA to be more analogous than the Labor Disputes Statute;415 therefore,
Gencorp's motion to vacate was timely filed.
A United States Court of Appeals has held the time limitations period
for filing a motion to vacate an arbitration award in Illinois' version"4
6 of
the UAA"47 applies in a dispute involving Section 301 of the NLRA.4"8 In
Plumber's Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas ' 9 plaintiff employees
received an arbitration award compelling defendant employer to contribute
to several union benefit funds. After the ninety day limitations period within
which to contest the award lapsed, defendant filed an appeal, claiming that
the arbitration board did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the
employees involved were not covered by the collective bargaining agreement
containing the arbitration clause.'2 The appellate court considered the effect
of the Supreme Court's decision in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters'2' on the application of the UAA to Section 301 disputes.' 2 In
DelCostello, the Court applied the NLRA's six month limitations period423
to a Section 301 dispute, rather than using the forum state's arbitration
statute to determine the limitations period. The DelCostello Court identified
two factors which influenced its decision; Section 160(b) of the NLRA was
more analogous to a Section 301 dispute than the state arbitration statute,
and important federal policies were at stake.' 2 4 The Supreme Court in
DelCostello expressly noted, however, that DelCostello "should not be taken
as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal
causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere."'' 7 The Seventh Circuit in Domas
412. Gencorp, Inc., 622 F. Supp. at 218-19.
413. UAA § 12(a)(4).
414. Gencorp, Inc., 622 F. Supp. at 217.
415. Id. at 219.
416. IL. ANw. STAT. ch 10, §112(b) (Smith-Hurd 1975).
417. UAA § 12(b).
418. Plumber's Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas, 778 F.2d 1266 (7th
Cir. 1985).
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1268.
421. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
422. Domas, 778 F.2d at 1268.
423. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
424. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166.
425. Id. at 171.
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relied on this language in DelCostello to distinguish the DelCostello decision,
and applied Illinois' arbitration statute to the dispute, rather than a federal
statute.42 The arbitration award was therefore enforced, as defendant's mo-
tion to vacate was not filed within the 90 day limit imposed in the Illinois
statute.
4 27
In an action brought under Section 301 of the NLRA, federal, law, rather
than a state borrowing statute, governs the choice between the forum state's
statute of limitations and that of another state. 4" In Champion International
Corporation v. United Paperworkers International Union,2 9 defendant em-
ployees won an arbitration award following a dispute over work scheduling
and seniority. Plaintiff Champion filed suit to vacate the arbitration award
in a Tennessee district federal court. The dispute arose in Mississippi, and
Mississippi's law would have barred Champion's appeal for failure to timely
file the motion to vacate. The court applied Tennessee's version of the UAA4"
in determining that the plaintiff's suit to vacate the award was timely filed. 431
The court followed the general borrowing rule of using the forum state's
limitations period, and distinguished DelCostello on much the same basis as
the Domas court had done. 432 In order to better serve federal policies and
diminish confusion, the Champion court held that federal choice of law
demands that the forum state's most analogous limitations period control. 43
Only if a party can show an undermining of federal policy or undue hardship,
may a federal statute of limitations apply.4 3 '
IX. JUDGMENTS ON AWARDS
A. Judgment on Award Entered by Court
Once the court grants an order confirming, modifying or correcting an
award, the UAA provides that "judgment shall be entered in conformity
therewith." '4 5 In Wessell Brothers v. Crossett Public School District'4 36 the
426. Domas, 778 F.2d at 1269.
427. Id. at 1270.
428. Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328
(6th Cir. 1985).
429. Id.
430. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-213(b) (1980) (superceded by § 29-5-313
(Supp. 1985)).
431. Champion, 779 F.2d at 331-32.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 334.
434. Id.
435. UAA § 14.
436. 287 Ark. 415, 701 S.W.2d 99 (1985).
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Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a circuit court judgment which did not
conform to the arbitrator's award. 37 A school district, architect, contractor,
and subcontractor entered into arbitration when disputes arose over structural
defects in a school building. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of the
school district, giving a detailed division of payment to be made by each
defendant. The award provided that the defendants were severally liable. 438
The circuit court, however, entered a judgment providing for joint and several
liability. " 9 The supreme court reversed, relying on the Arkansas Arbitration
Act." Absent a showing of grounds to support vacating or modifying an
arbitrator's award, the court is to confirm an award and enter a judgment
in conformity with the award.4 '' The supreme court held that it was error
for the circuit court to enter a judgment calling for joint and several liability
when the arbitrator's award called for several liability only." 2
When an arbitration award is contingent on the occurrence of an event
and such occurrence is neither alleged nor proven, dismissal of a complaint
for judgment on the award is proper."3 In Russell H. Lankton Const. Co.
v. LaHood,4" Lankton contracted to supply and install air conditioning and
heating units in LaHood's buildings. A dispute arose regarding payment for
and completion of work, and the dispute was submitted to arbitration as
provided by contract. An arbitration award was issued which provided that
Lankton was entitled to be paid by LaHood within 15 days after the issuance
of a Final Certificate of Payment by the architect." 5 The trial court dismissed
Lankton's subsequent "Complaint for Judgment on Award."" 6 The appel-
late court determined that Lankton's pleading failed to allege or prove the
issuance of the Certificate of Payment, as required by the arbitration award." 7
The court noted that other Illinois courts facing similar nonarbitration sit-
uations had applied a common law breach of contract theory, requiring that
the party seeking compensation plead and prove the issuance of the architect's
certificate.40 The court then reasoned that because the awarded payment was
contingent upon the certificate and because Lankton could neither plead nor
prove its issuance, dismissal was proper." 9
437. Id. at 422, 701 S.W.2d at 103.
438. Id. at 419, 701 S.W.2d at 101.
439. Id. at 417, 701 S.W.2d at 100.
440. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-522, 523 (1985) are identical to UAA §§ 12, 13.
441. Wessell Bros. Found. Drilling Co. v. Crossett Public School Dist., 287
Ark. 415, 420, 701 S.W.2d 99, 102 (1985).
442. Id. at 419, 701 S.W.2d at 102.
443. Russell H. Lankton Construction Co. v. LaHood, 143 I11. App. 3d 806, 493
N.E.2d 714 (1986).
444. Id.
445. Id. at 807, 493 N.E.2d at 715.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 808, 493 N.E.2d at 716.
448. Id.
449. Id. Although procedural inadequacies barred Lankton's action, it is ira-
44




Generally, a court will not add prejudgment interest to an arbitration
award. In Creative Builders, Inc. v. Avenue Developments, Inc. ,410 both
parties sought confirmation of an arbitration award in the trial court. Neither
sought prejudgment interest. The trial court, however, held sua sponte that
the arbitrators erred in not awarding prejudgment interest because in Ari-
zona, "an award of prejudgment interest is allowed as a matter of right on
a liquidated claim." 451 The appellate court ruled that any claim that a party
had for prejudgment interest was presumed to be included in the arbitration
award. 4 2 Therefore, the court had no authority to modify the award by
adding prejudgment interest. 453
In Hedlund v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 414 Hedlund sought an order
confirming an arbitration award and an order of judgment on the award to
include prejudgment interest. 455 The district court refused to award the pre-
judgment interest. 4 6 The appellate court affirmed the denial of prejudgment
interest, holding that the arbitration statute does not permit the trial court
to award prejudgment interest upon a motion for confirmation of an award
when interest was not awarded by the arbitrators . 57
Prejudgment interest was also denied in Wanschura v. Western National
Mutual Insurance Co.45 1 The father of a child killed in a traffic accident
obtained an arbitration award based upon an uninsured motorist claim. The
claimant moved to confirm the award and requested prejudgment interest.
The court held that it would not modify the award by adding prejudgment
interest. The court justified its decision by the presumption favoring the
finality of arbitration awards. The court stated that the presumption is nec-
essary in order to promote arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive
method of dispute resolution. 4 9
X. APPEALS
The UAA provides for the appeal of an order: (1) denying an application
to compel arbitration; (2) granting an application to stay arbitration; and (3)
portant that the court made no observation regarding Lankton's possible attempt to
compel further arbitration pursuant to the Illinois Arbitration Act. The court's hold-
ing expressed no intent "to bar collection of the amount ultimately found due under
the award." Id.
450. 148 Ariz. 452, 715 P.2d 308 (1986).
451. Id. at __, 715 P.2d at 313.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. 377 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 464.
458. 389 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
459. Id. at 928.
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confirming, denying to confirm, modifying, correcting or vacating an award." 0
Judgments or decrees entered pursuant to the provisions of the UAA may
also be appealed."' Although the UAA does not expressly provide for the
appeal of an order granting an application to compel arbitration, courts have
allowed appeals of such orders.46 An order granting a motion to stay judicial
proceedings has been held non-appealable as a final order or an interlocutory
order."31
A. Orders Compelling Arbitration
An order compelling arbitration was held to be appealable in Evansville-
Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Evansville Teachers Association. 4 When a
dispute arose as to whether a Side Letter Agreement was part of the collective
bargaining agreement between the teachers and the school district, the teach-
ers' association filed a complaint requesting an order to compel arbitration.
The circuit court issued the order and the school district appealed.460 Ad-
dressing the issue of whether the order was appealable,'" 6 the Indiana Court
of Appeals stated that "the order compelling arbitration is appealable in this
case, either as a final judgement as to that issue, [because there was no longer
a justiciable issue before the court] or as a permitted interlocutory appeal.""467
The court also cited a policy consideration for its decision, stating that "with-
holding the right to appeal and compelling the parties to go through useless
arbitration proceedings is counter-productive."4"
B. Orders Staying Judicial Proceedings
An order granting a motion to stay judicial proceedings pending arbi-
tration is not appealable as a final order or as an interlocutory order granting
460. UAA § 19.
461. UAA § 19 provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying an application to compel
arbitration made under Section 2; (2) An order granting an application to stay ar-
bitration made under Section 2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation
of an award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating
an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant
to the provisions of this act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from
orders or judgments in a civil action.
462. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Indian Prairie Educ. Ass'n, 13 III. App. 3d
1040, 487 N.E.2d 1149 (1985).
463. U.S. Insulation Inc. v. Hilro Construction, 146 Ariz. 250,705 P.2d 490 (1985).
464. - Ind. App. -, 494 N.E.2d 321 (1986).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 325. The appeals provision of the Indiana UAA is identical to UAA
§ 19. Compare UAA § 19 with IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-19 (Burns Supp. 1986).
467. Id. (citing IND. RuLEs App. PRoc., Rule 4(B)(6)).
468. Id.
46
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an injunction.469 In Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin,47 0 the plaintiff brought
an action against a fellow joint venturer in the district court alleging viola-
tions of federal and state securities laws in the district court. The district
court granted the defendant's motion to stay the proceedings pending arbi-
tration. The Tenth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether an order
granting a motion to stay judicial proceedings is appealable as a final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 which allows appeal from a final order, or as an
interlocutory order granting an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which
allows appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction. The court
held that the motion to stay was not final under Section 1291 because it did
not have the effect of terminating all federal litigation on the merits.471 In
determining the appealability of the matter under Section 1292(a)(1), the
court noted that an order staying proceedings in federal district court is
appealable if: (I) the action in which the order was made is an action which
by its nature would be an action at law before the fusion of law and equity;
and (2) the stay was sought to permit the determination of an equitable
defense or counterclaim. 472 The court stated that the granting of the motion
to stay fulfilled the second prong. 473 However, the court held that first prong
was not met because plaintiff's securities claims seeking rescission and dam-
ages would not qualify as a purely legal action before the fusion of the law
and equity.474 Therefore, the court disallowed an appeal from the motion to
stay judicial proceedings. 4 "1
C. Orders Denying the Compulsion of Arbitration
Although the UAA specifically provides that an order denying the com-
pulsion of arbitration is appealable, ' 76 on occasion a party argues that an
appeal should not be allowed. For example, in U. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro
Const. Co.,477 plaintiff filed suit for damages caused by defendant's repu-
diation of a contract. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and
to stay court proceedings. The trial court denied defendant's motion to com-
pel arbitration and defendant appealed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the
trial court's order was interlocutory in nature, and as such, was not ap-
pealable until final judgment was rendered. 4 8 The appellate court, however,
469. Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 776 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1985).
470. Id.
471. Id. at 890.
472. Id. at 891.
473. Id. at 892.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. UAA § 19.
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held that the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is substantively ap-
pealable.479
XI. JuDicUM PROCEEDINGS
Although arbitration is a non-judicial proceeding, the UAA does au-
thorize limited judicial involvement. Generally, the UAA empowers courts
to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists"' and enforce,
the agreement by compelling arbitration or, when appropriate, by staying
arbitration or judicial proceedings.4a
Once an arbitration award is rendered, the court may confirm,4" correct,
modify"' or vacate"' the award. Upon the granting of an order confirming,
correcting or modifying an award, the court must enter a judgment in con-
formity therewith.4' Jurisdiction lies with the courts of competent jurisdiction
in the state." In proceedings to confirm, modify or vacate awards, courts
must rule upon a variety of issues which may be raised by the parties.
Although courts generally rule on the arbitrability of a claim, the responsi-
bility may be shifted to a state administrative agency or board."4 The issue
of waiver of the right to compel arbitration is to be determined by a court,
not an arbitrator.4' The res judicata effect of a prior arbitration award is
also to be determined by a court.490 In Pennsylvania, a court may rule upon
constitutional attacks on an arbitrator's award."'9 A court may also have the
power, under a state's arbitration act, to review an arbitration award rendered
pursuant to a state law which prohibits review."92
479. Id. (quoting Aiiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2101.01(A)(1) (1982); Rancho
Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 174, 183, 680 P.2d 1235,
1244 (1984)).
480. UAA § 2(a).
481. UAA § 17.
482. UAA § 2.
483. UAA§ 11.
484. UAA § 13.
485. UAA § 12.
486. UAA § 14.
487. UAA § 17.
488. Board of Education for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774,
506 A.2d 625 (1986).
489. Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Comm'r, 150 Mich. App.
173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
490. Monmouth Public Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 141 Ill. App. 3d 60,
489 N.E.2d 1100 (1985).
491. Pa. Social Services Union v. Commonwealth of Pa. Bd. of Probation &
Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 272, 508 A.2d 360 (1986).
492. Appeal of Upper Providence Police Lodge, - Pa. Commw. - , 502
A.2d 263 (1985).
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Typically courts are responsible for ruling on the arbitrability of indi-
vidual claims made under a valid arbitration agreement.4 93 However, in lim-
ited instances, this responsibility may be shifted to a state administrative
igency or board.49 In Board of Education for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard 95
the appellate court ruled that the State Board of Education, rather than the
circuit court, had primary jurisdiction in determining the arbitrability of
claims concerning teaching certificate classification and class size.49 In Hub-
bard, one dispute arose when a group of Dorchester County teachers objected
to reductions in their teaching certificate classifications. Another dispute
arose when a group of teachers in Garrett county filed a grievance because
of their School Board's failure to hire enough teachers to accommodate class
size. In each case, the teachers tried to submit their disputes to arbitration.
The Dorchester County School Board sought to stay arbitration on the ground
that the certification issue was not arbitrable. The Garrett County Board
sought to vacate an arbitration award on similar grounds. Both circuit courts
held that the issues were arbitrable, ruling in favor of the teachers.4 97 On
appeal, the cases were consolidated, and the appellate court raised sua sponte
the issue of whether the courts should defer to the State Board of Educa-
tion.4 98 Despite holding that the circuit courts in Maryland were authorized
to entertain the actions, 499 the court ultimately found that the State Board
of Education had primary jurisdiction.5 w The court justified judicial defer-
ence to the State Board of Education by recognizing that the Board's "par-
amount role ... in interpreting the public education laws sets it apart from
most administrative agencies."' 5
The issue of waiver is to be determined by the court, not the arbitrator.
In Joba Construction Co. v. Monroe County Drain Commissioner/° Monroe
County issued a stop work order against Joba and Joba filed a demand to
arbitrate. Subsequent to the demand, Joba filed for a writ of mandamus in
Monroe County Circuit Court alleging that the County Commissioner had
tortiously interfered with the contract. The Commissioner moved to prohibit
arbitration on the ground that by filing suit Joba had waived its right to
493. Recent Developments 1985, supra note 3, at 190; Recent Developments
1984, supra note 3, at 229.
494. Board of Educ. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 506 A.2d
625 (1986).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 792, 506 A.2d at 634.
497. Id. at 782-85, 506 A.2d at 629-30.
498. Id. at 787, 506 A.2d at 631.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 791, 506 A.2d at 633. It is significant to note that although the
court vested primary jurisdiction in the Board, a body independent from the arbi-
tration proceeding was given the power to determine arbitrability.
502. 150 Mich. App. 173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
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arbitration. 3 The circuit court granted the Commissioner's motion. The
decision, however, was vacated on appeal on the basis that the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction over the waiver issue as waiver could be determined
only by the arbitrator.5 Monroe County appealed to the Michigan Supreme
Court which remanded to the appellate court. The court of appeals was
instructed to again determine whether the circuit court or the arbitrator was
the proper forum to decide if a party has waived the right to arbitrate.5
Without discussing its rationale or citing any authority for its decision, the
appellate court concluded that the circuit court should decide the waiver
question.0 6 The circuit court then held that Joba's filing of the tort claim
did constitute a waiver of the right to arbitrate."0'
The res judicata effect of a prior arbitration award is also to be decided
by the court.30' In Monmouth Public Schools v. Pullen,' Pullen was on mater-
nity leave for the first semester of the 1981-1982 school year and was subse-
quently denied credit for a full year's work on the 1982-1983 teachers' salary
schedule. Pullen's initial grievance was ruled nonarbitrable because it had not
been filed in a timely manner as specified by the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the District and the teachers.I' 0 She then filed another grievance
requesting the salary schedule credit for the same 1981-82 time period. The
second grievance included a new request that "all other teachers affected in
like manner be properly placed on the salary schedule."'I Despite this addi-
tional request, the second grievance still arose from Pullen's failure to advance
on the salary schedule because of her. maternity leave. The trial judge found
this second claim barred by res judicata."' The appellate court also ruled in
favor of the School District, holding that under the Illinois Arbitration Act
provision authorizing stays of arbitration, the court could properly decide
whether a prior arbitration award removed a specific issue from the scope of




507. Id. at 179, 388 N.W.2d at 254. The court reached this conclusion despite
Construction Industry Arbitration Rule 47 which stated that no judicial proceeding
relating to the subject matter shall be deemed a waiver of the party's right to arbitrate.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that if Rule 47 meant no court
proceeding could ever constitute a waiver, it would be adverse to MCL § 600.5035
which states that arbitration does not effect the equitable power of the court over
arbitrators, awards, etc. The court of appeals also relied on judicial economy to
prohibit arbitration because claims relevant to the arbitration would also have to be
heard in the circuit court resulting in duplication of evidence.
508. Monmouth Public Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 141 Iln. App. 3d 60,
489 N.E.2d 1100 (1985).
509. Id.
510. Id. at 62, 489 N.E.2d at 1101.
511. Id. at 62, 489 N.E.2d at 1101-02.
512. Id. at 63, 489 N.E.2d at 1102.
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arbitration. " ' Under the same provision, the court ruled that "the defense
of res judicata may be timely raised by a motion to stay arbitration," and
that the effect given a prior award is a matter to be determined by the court.II'
Pennsylvania courts can exercise review of an arbitration decision to
remedy any alleged constitutional violations. 5 In Pennsylvania Social Serv-
ices Union v. Commonwealth Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role,53 6 William Pryor was dismissed from his job as a. human services aide
after being caught in possession of drugs. Pryor's dismissal was submitted
to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Board of Probation.1' 7 The arbitrator upheld Pryor's dismissal
and the Union appealed. The first issue the commonwealth court addressed
was whether it could review the arbitrator's decision. The court held that
since Section 903 of the Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act compelled
state collective bargaining employees to arbitrate, the court could exercise its
right of review under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act.518 The Union alleged
that Pryor's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and his
right to due process were violated. Regarding the unreasonable search claim,
the court held that exclusionary rule evidence is not applicable in arbitration
proceedings, and thus, there was no violation of Pryor's Fourth Amendment
rights. 15 9 As to the due process claim, the court found that no violation of
due process occurred since Pryor received pre-termination notice and was
well represented by union counsel at the arbitration hearing.- 20
Courts may also have the authority under a state's arbitration act to
review an arbitrator's decision reached pursuant to a state law which prohibits
review.5 21 In Appeal of Upper Providence Police Lodge,5 " a dispute arose
concerning Act 111, which gave policemen and firemen the right to collec-
tively bargain. The dispute was submitted to arbitration and the Board of
Arbitrators held that policemen's hospital and medical benefits would be
discontinued after one year. The Union appealed the award.1" In response,
the township of Upper Providence argued that arbitration decisions under
513. Id. at 64-65, 489 N.E.2d at 1103.
514. Id. at 69-70, 489 N.E.2d at 1105.
515. Pa. Social Services Union v. Commonwealth Pa. Bd. of Probation &
Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 272, 508 A.2d 360 (1986).
516. Id.
517. Id. at -, 508 A.2d at 362.
518. Id. at -, 508 A.2d at 363.
519. Id. at , 508 A.2d at 364.
520. Id. at , 508 A.2d at 364-365.
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Act 11112 were not appealable.5m Although Act ill specifically stated that
awards rendered by the Board of Arbitrators were not appealable, the court
held that the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act' permitted courts to review ar-
bitration awards where "a political subdivision submits a controversy with
an employee or a representative of employees to arbitration.'"'7 The township
contended that an official source note S21 to the Arbitration Act demonstrated
that the general assembly did not intend to disturb narrow certiorari as the
scope of judicial review under Act 11 .5" However, the commonwealth court
noted that the case referred to in the official source note referred to the
scope of review for an act other than Act 111."3 The court further noted
that in the event the official source note did refer to the scope of review for
Act 111,"' the text of a statute controls where there is a conflict between
the text and a comment." 2 Thus, if the note meant to say that narrow
certiorari remains the scope of review for awards of arbitrators, it is incon-
sistent with the text of the Arbitration Act and must be disregarded."' There-
fore, the court did have the power to review the award."'
524. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 217.1-217.10 (Purdon 1968).
525. Upper Providence, - Pa. Commw. -, 502 A.2d at 264. Section 7(a)
of the Act, which was in dispute, stated that no appeal therefrom of the determination
of the majority of the Board of Arbitrators shall be allowed to any court. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously interpreted this section to mean that all
board awards were final and that common pleas courts had no jurisdiction on appeal.
The only exception was that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would entertain appeals
on narrow certiorari, granting review only of jurisdiction, regularity of proceedings,
questions of abuse of powers, and constitutional questions.
526. Id. at - , 502 A.2d at 265. The statute the court relied on postdated
both Act Ill and the Washington Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437
(1969).
527. Upper Providence, - Pa. Commw. -, 502 A.2d at 265.
528. An official source note is one attached to a bill introduced in the state
general assembly generally explaining the purpose or reasoning behind the legislation.
529. Id. The source note stated that subsection (d) was intended to preserve
without change the scope of review which presently exists over awards of arbitrators.
530. Id. at - , 502 A.2d at 266.
531. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1939 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
532. Upper Providence, - Pa. Commw. - , 502 A.2d at 266.
533. Id. The dissent pointed out that Act Ill specifically avoids using the
courts for dispute resolution. The only method for settling grievance disputes is
arbitration. Thus, the object of Act I I would be completely frustrated by permitting
court intervention. The dissent also noted that when the trial court first addressed
the issue, it held that arbitrations under Act 111 were not appealable and refused to
hear the case. The dissent interpreted the official source note to Section 7302 to
indicate an intent to preserve without change the scope of review which presently
exists over awards of arbitrators such as those appointed under Act 111. The dissent
asserted that the majority had reversed itself, in contravention of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's view, to prevent increasing judicial review of arbitration awards.
534. Id. at - , 502 A.2d at 265.
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XII. JUDICLAL REvIEw
When parties contract to arbitrate a dispute and an award is rendered,
courts will apply a very narrow standard of review in order to encourage the
enforcement and strengthen the finality of arbitration awards.3- When there
is no dispute as to the existence of the arbitration agreement, a court will
uphold an arbitrator's award unless it is completely irrational. 36 When there
is a dispute as to the existence of the agreement, a court may undertake a
de novo review. 537 A court will uphold an arbitrator's interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement if the interpretation can be derived from the
agreement in any rational way." An arbitrator's interpretation of contractual
requirements should be considered final unless the contract itself is contrary
to public policy.3 9 An award must clearly exceed the scope of the issues
presented for arbitration before it will be modified. A court should interfere
with an arbitrator's decision to exclude evidence only when the exclusion has
led to a complete omission of critical evidence.341
When there is no dispute as to the existence of an arbitration agreement,
a court will uphold an arbitrator's award unless it is completely irrational.A' 2
When the existence of the agreement is in dispute, however, the court will
undertake a de novo review.A' 3 In Barclay Townhouse Associates v. Mes-
sersmith,5" a dispute arose between a subcontractor and a general contractor
regarding the scope and quality of the construction work being performed.
When the subcontractor demanded arbitration, the general contractor and
the developer claimed that no written agreement to arbitrate existed. The
subcontractor, however, received an arbitration award in his favor. The cir-
cuit court affirmed the award, finding nothing to render its issuance "com-
pletely irrational" and consequently finding no grounds to vacate. 4 On
535. Barclay Townhouse Ass'n v. Messersmith, 67 Md. App. 493, 508 A.2d
507 (1986)
536. Id.
537. Id. at 497-98, 508 A.2d at 509-10.
538. Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Joint Comm. v. Upper
Bucks Vocational Technical School Educ. Ass'n, 91 Pa. Commw. 413, , 497
A.2d at 943, 946 (1985).
539. Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1300 v. Mass Transit Admin., 305 Md.
380, 504 A.2d 1132 (1986).
540. Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328,
335 (6th Cir. 1985).
541. City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 461 (Alaska
1986).




545. Id. at 495-96, 508 A.2d at 508.
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appeal, the court ruled that the "completely irrational" standard was ap-
propriate where the existence of the arbitration agreement was a matter of
mutual agreement, and neither party challenged jurisdiction.5' However, when
"the basic jurisdiction of the arbitration is challenged," the court found the
"completely irrational" standard totally inappropriate. A The appellate court
noted that when parties contract to arbitrate a dispute and an award is
rendered, the court applies a very narrow standard of review to encourage
enforcement of arbitration awards A" The appellate court held that "where
the basic jurisdiction of the arbitration is challenged, the court must under-
take a de novo review to determine if such an agreement exists.'""' The case
was remanded to the circuit court to determine the existence of the agree-
ment. 5 s
A court will uphold an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement if that interpretation can in any rational way be derived
from the agreement.5 51 In Upper Bucks County Area Vocational-Technical
School Joint Committee v. Upper Bucks County Vocational Technical School
Ass'n,11 a dispute arose over the issue of whether teachers should receive
back pay for days missed because of a strike. The teachers claimed that
according to their contract, the days missed must be made up. The Upper
Bucks County Education Association (U.P.C.E.A.), however, decided the
days were not to be made up. The dispute was brought before an arbitrator,
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, who ruled that the teachers
should receive eight days of back pay. The U.P.C.E.A. moved for vacation
or modification of the award in the trial court, claiming that the award was
against public policy of the commonwealth. The court noted that the scope
of its review of an arbitrator's award was defined by the "essence" test."3
The "essence" test, established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, states
"[if the] award is based on a resolution of a question of fact [it] is to be
respected by the judiciary if 'the interpretation can in any rational way be
derived from the [collective bargaining] agreement, viewed in light of its
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention'. " 55 The
court added, however, that if an arbitrator's award against the common-
wealth conflicts with a fundamental policy of the commonwealth as expressed
546. Id. at 498, 508 A.2d at 510.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 496, 508 A.2d at 509.
549. Id. at 498, 508 A.2d at 510.
550. Id.
551. Upper Bucks County Area Vocational-Technical School Joint Comm. v.
Upper Bucks County Vocational Technical School Ass'n, 91 Pa. Commw. 463,
-, 497 A.2d 943, 945 (1985).
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id. at , 497 A.2d at 946.
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in statutory law, then the judiciary has express statutory authority to correct
or modify the award."'S The court concluded that the arbitrator's award did
not conflict with any statutory law, the "essence" test was satisfied, and
therefore, the court upheld the arbitrator's award.15'
An arbitrator's decision concerning the interpretation of contractual re-
quirements, although nearly always final, may be overturned if the contract
itself is contrary to public policy.5 7 Amalgamated Transit Union Division
1300 v. Mass Transit Administration,""8 involved a dispute over the contrac-
tual requirements that had to be fulfilled before the Mass Transit Admin-
istration [hereinafter MTA] could discharge a union driver. Pursuant to the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the controversy was submitted to
arbitration. The arbitrator found that the driver who had been discharged
for misconduct, operated a bus with the odor of alcohol on his breath without
being under the influence. The arbitrator ruled this did not constitute just
cause for discharge, and ordered reinstatement of the driver. 59 After MTA's
refusal to reinstate the driver, the union sought specific performance of the
arbitration award, but the trial court denied the union's request.560 The court
of appeals stated:
Having bargained for the decision of the arbitrator on the question of
whether [the driver's conduct] constituted 'just cause' for discharge, the
parties are bound by it.... [Sbo far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling [the
arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."'
The court, however, noted a public policy exception to the finality of the
arbitrator's contract interpretation, stating: "As with any contract, 'a court
may not enforce a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public
policy'." 562 The appellate court held, therefore, that "for MTA to prevail it
must demonstrate that Maryland public policy compels the discharge of a
public bus operator for having the odor of alcohol on his breath, although
the operator was not under the influence. . . ." mThe court concluded that
Maryland's public policy did not compel the discharge. Therefore, the court
ruled that judicial intrusion was not permitted into a dispute which, according
to the parties' labor contract, is to be resolved exclusively by the arbitrator
chosen by them. 64
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1300 v. Mass Transit Admin., 305 Md.
380, -, 504 A.2d 1132, 1136 (1986).
558. Id.
559. Id. at 385, 504 A.2d at 1134.
560. Id. at 387, 504 A.2d at 1135.
561. Id. at 388, 504 A.2d at 1136.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 390, 504 A.2d at 1137.
564. Id. at 381-82, 504 A.2d at 1132-33.
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An arbitrator's award must clearly exceed the scope of the issues sub-
mitted before a court will modify the award.16' In Champion International
Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union,"6 a union had prepared
two grievances for arbitration, but withdrew one of the issues before arbi-
tration. Despite the withdrawal, the arbitrator issued an award based on both
grievances. The district court modified the award because it exceeded the
scope of the submitted issues.1' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged
that there is a presumption that an arbitrator's award is within the scope of
the submitted issues. A8 The presumption is overcome, however, where "an
arbitrator has clearly exceeded the scope of the submission. ... " ",,9 The court
concluded that the arbitrator clearly exceeded the submitted issues by basing
the award on an issue-that had been withdrawn." 0 As a result, the appellate
court affirmed the district court's modification of the arbitration award.",
A court should interfere with an arbitrator's decision to exclude evidence
only when the exclusion has led to a complete omission of critical evidence. 72
In City of Fairbanks Municipal Utilities System v. Lees,S" Lees was fired by
the city for failing to properly perform his maintenance duties. The dispute
was submitted to arbitration whereupon the arbitrator determined that Lees'
firing was justified. Lees sought judicial review of the decision, claiming that
the arbitrator's decision was invalid because the arbitrator excluded one of
Lees' witnesses, thereby depriving him of his right to a fair hearing. After
a trial de novo, the superior court partially vacated the arbitration award
claiming the arbitrator had improperly excluded the evidence. On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court's finding and affirmed
the arbitrator's decision."" The supreme court reasoned that it is not the
court's function to hear the case de novo and to consider the evidence pre-
sented to the arbitrator. 5" An arbitrator has great flexibility concerning ques-
tions of admissibility of evidence, and courts should interfere with an
arbitration award only when the arbitrator's exclusion of evidence has led
to a complete omission of critical evidence.
7 6
565. Champion Int'l Corp. v. United Paperworks Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328,
335 (6th Cir. 1986).
566. Id.
567. Id. at 329-30.
568. Id. at 335.
569. Id. (emphasis added).
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1986).
573. Id.
574. Id. at 459.








In Southland Corp. v. Keating,5"7 the United States Supreme Court held
that state arbitration law is, in part, preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act [hereinafter FAA].578 The FAA will preempt where there is a written
arbitration agreement evidencing a maritime transaction or a transaction
involving interstate 79 or international commerce.5 81 Courts have read the
phrase "interstate commerce" as encompassing agreements that touch upon
8
'
or have a slight nexus with commerce between states.s 2 When the FAA is
held to be applicable, it will control, regardless of the choice of law provision
in the arbitration agreement. 83 State contracts law, however, may be utilized
to interpret a contract issue arising under an agreement governed by the
FAA. 584
In Ex Parte Costa and Head (Atrium) Ltd., 85 the court held that where
parties to the arbitration of a major construction contract were from several
states, the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was controlled
by the FAA. Costa and Head, owners and architects of the project under
construction became dissatisfied with the performance of Duncan, its general
contractor, during the course of construction. Costa and Head brought suit
in circuit court after Duncan refused to permit access to certain project
records, and Duncan met this complaint with a suit of its own for breach
of the construction contract. Costa and Head then added suits for fraud and
breach of contract, and included a claim that arbitration should be compelled
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract and trial stayed pending
arbitration.8 6 On appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration,
Costa and Head contended that the FAA applied. Duncan argued that the
577. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
578. Id. at 10-11; See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
579. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
580. Dolomite S.P.A. v. Beconta, Inc., 129 Misc. 2d 857, 858-59, 493 N.Y.S.2d
705, 707 (1985).
581. Ainsworth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 52, 55-56 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
582. Ex Parte Costa and Head (Atrium) Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala.
1986).
583. Ainsworth, 634 F. Supp. at 54.
584. Hope v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 3d 446, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 439 (1986).
585. 486 So. 2d 1272.
586. Id. at 1273.
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contract did not evidence a transaction involving interstate commerce, and
therefore did not meet the established criterion for application of the FAA.', 7
The court rejected Duncan's claim, looking to the multi-state residences of
the parties, and the fact that subcontractors and materials were brought to
Alabama from out of state." Noting that the interstate commerce require-
ment of the FAA was to be very broadly construed, the court held that the
"slightest nexus" between the transaction and interstate commerce would
bring the agreement within the ambit of the federal statute."8
In Dolomite S.P.A. v. Beconta, Inc.,5" the court held that the arbitration
clause in an agreement concerning international business must be enforced
pursuant to the FAA rather than state law. In Dolomite, the parties entered
into an arbitration agreement when Dolomite, an Italian ski boot manufac-
turer, discovered that its American joint venture partner, Beconta, had stolen
money from Dolomite. Dolomite then brought suit to rescind the agreement,
claiming fraudulent inducement.5 9' The court held that the FAA preempted
state arbitration law.592 The issue of fraudulent inducement would not have
been arbitrable under state law. Under the body of federal substantive law
created by the FAA, however, it was deemed arbitrable.19 Dolomite also
argued for a stay of arbitration under a specific provision of the New York
Arbitration law" 4 which was in conflict with the FAA. The court found the
state procedural rule inapplicable on the basis that the outcome would be
contrary to that which would be reached in a federal court. The court stated
that once a dispute falls within the reach of the FAA, it applies to all issues
of enforceability and validity.'"
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1823
v. WGN of Colorado Inc., 96 the court held that the UAA as adopted by
Colorado is preempted in its entirety by the FAA in agreements which involve
interstate commerce. 97 The union brought an action to vacate the arbitration
award on the basis that procedures used by the arbitration panel did not
meet the requirements of the Colorado Arbitration Act. The court summarily
dismissed this claim, citing Collins Radio Co. v. Fx-Cell-O Corp.'" as au-
587. Id. at 1274.
588. Id. at 1275.
589. Id.
590. 129 Misc. 2d 857, 493 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1985).
591. Id. at 858, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
592. Id. at 859, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
593. Id.
594. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7503(b).
595. Dolomite, 129 Misc. 2d at 859-60, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
596. 615 F. Supp. 64 (D. Colo. 1985).
597. Id. at 65.
598. 467 F.2d 995, 999 (8th Cir. 1972).
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thority that all of the provisions of the state act were superceded by the FAA
when the agreement was one involving interstate commerce.5"
In Circle S Enterprises, Inc. v. Stanley Smith & Sons,600 the court held
that a state arbitration law which would have rendered an arbitration clause
unenforceable was preempted by the FAA. 60 ' Circle S entered into a contract
with a general contractor for the construction of a truck stop in South
Carolina. The contract included a provision to arbitrate disputes. When a
problem arose, Circle S refused to participate in the arbitration, stating that
the provision in the contract was unenforceable under state law.On The South
Carolina Arbitration Act included a provision requiring notice on the front
page of the contract that the parties would be subject to arbitration. 60 This
notice was not included on the contract. The court refused to apply the South
Carolina law, holding the FAA to be controlling as interstate commerce was
involved.' The court noted that although the contract did not specify any
out-of-state suppliers or subcontractors, in fact, some part of the contract
was performed outside Alabama.60 Moreover, the nature and extent of the
work to be done was such that anyone concerned would have understood
that materials or work from out-of-state would be necessary."'
The court in Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed and Produce, Inc.,"' found
that a similar provision in the Missouri Arbitration Act could not be used to
defeat arbitration when the FAA applied."' Bunge obtained an arbitration
award through default when Perryville Feed failed to deliver under the con-
tract and refused to take part in the arbitration proceedings. When Bunge
brought an action in circuit court to confirm the award, Perryville Feed ob-
jected on the grounds that the contract did not contain the required arbitra-
tion notice. The circuit court held that the contract did not meet the notice
requirements of the Missouri statute."' On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that the contract was clearly within the purview of the FAA, as it called
for delivery of agricultural products in Illinois, and thus, involved interstate
599. International Brotherhood, 615 F. Supp. at 65, 68.
600. 288 S.C. 428, 343 S.E.2d 45 (1986).
601. Id. at -, 343 S.E.2d at 46-47.
602. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
603. Circle S, 288 S.C. at - , 343 S.E.2d at 46.
604. Id. at -, 343 S.E.2d at 47.
605. Id. at . 343 S.E.2d at 46.
606. Id.
607. 685 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
608. Id. at 839.
609. Id. at 838. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.460 (1986) requires a contract with an
arbitration clause to contain the following language:
"THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION
WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES."
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commerce.6" Therefore, the court refused to apply the Missouri notice require-
ment. 611
In Ainsworth v. Allstate Insurance Co.,6 2 the court held that the FAA
may preempt contrary state law, even when the arbitration clause declares
state law to be controlling. 63 Plaintiff, Director of the Missouri Division of
Insurance acting as receiver of two insolvent insurance companies, sought to
recover payment of reinsurance funds due under contracts between defendant
and the insolvent insurers. The contracts provided for arbitration of disputes
and stated that Missouri law was controlling. Missouri law authorized the
Director to maintain a court action to settle the affairs of insolvent insurance
companies. 6 4 The suit was removed to federal court, where defendant moved
to stay the proceedings pending arbitration under the FAA."65 The court
granted defendant's motion, holding that the preemptive authority of the
federal act could not be avoided by the choice of law provisions in the
contract6"6 or by the Missouri statute which specifically authorized court
action. 17 The court also concluded that since the reinsurance agreements
"touched on" interstate commerce, they were covered by the FAA. 6 8 The
court rejected plaintiff's argument that application of the FAA in this case
would be in conflict with the McCarran-Ferguson Act.619 The court reasoned
that arbitration statutes are laws of general applicability which pertain only
to methods of dispute resolution and do not regulate business.'2 Concluding
that application of the FAA would not affect the substantive remedy avail-
able, the court found no bar to enforcing arbitration under the FAA.'2 '
In Hope v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,6u the court held that although
the FAA superceded state arbitration law, state contract law could be used
in determining if an arbitration agreement had been revoked.6" In Hope,
610. Bunge Corp., 685 S.W.2d at 838.
611. Id. at 839.
612. 634 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
613. Id. at 57.
614. Id. at 53, 57 (citing Mo. Rv. STAT. § 375.660 (1986)).
615. Id. at 53. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides that, upon the application of the
parties, the court shall stay the trial until the arbitrable issue is arbitrated.
616. Ainsworth, 634 F. Supp. at 54-55.
617. Id. at 57.
618. Id. at 56.
619. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) provides that the insurance business "shall be
subject to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) states, "no act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, unless such act specifically relates to the business
of insurance."
620. Ainsworth, 634 F. Supp. at 57.
621. Id.
622. 181 Cal. App. 3d 446, 226 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1986).
623. Id. at - , 226 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
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stockbrokers sued their former employer, Dean Witter, under their employ-
ment contracts, claiming breach of contract and fraud. The employment
contract contained an arbitration clause. The stockbrokers contended that
the arbitration clause was contained in an unconscionable adhesion contract
and that unconscionability was a ground for revocation under California
law.62' Dean Witter moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause in the contracts. Upon denial of the motion, Dean Witter appealed,
contending that because the employment contracts involved interstate com-
merce, questions of enforceability of the arbitration clause were governed by
the FAA. The appellate court agreed that the federal statute was controlling,
but held that state contract law could be used to determine whether grounds
for revocation of the contract existedA6
624. Id. at -, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
625. Id. at -, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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